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Ebola is a filovirus and one of the most virulent organisms identified. It’s a zoonosis with 
fruit bats as the likeliest reservoir. Pathogen spill-over from infected animals causes human 
outbreaks with subsequent human-human transmission. The purpose of this thesis is to 
provide an overview of central aspects of the 2013-2016 West African Ebola Epidemic.  
 
Methods  
This thesis is based on references retrieved through the search engine PubMed, online WHO 
and CDC documents and on personal communication. References were sorted according to 
inclusion and exclusion criteria: language, abstract and full-text availability. Search results 
were scanned and screened by title and further assessed for relevancy by reading the abstract. 
External references were included after screening reference lists of included articles.  
 
Results  
Ebola was in 2013 a novel agent in West Africa. It took 3 months before its probability was 
identified. The rural epicentre with 80% forest loss is in proximity to borders of Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. Case amplification occurred through burial ceremonies and health facilities. 
The populations are highly mobile and convenient access across borders and to cities existed. 
A total of 815 probable and confirmed cases of health worker infections were identified from 
01.01.14-31.03.15. CFR was 2/3. Most health worker infections occurred outside Ebola 
Treatment Units (ETUs). Several risk factors in the work setting were identified and 
opportunities for community-acquired infections also existed. The keys to stop transmission 
include rapid detection of cases, construction of ETUs, contact tracing, safe burials and strict 
adherence to established protocols. The rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine show promising results.  
 
Conclusion 
West Africa’s lack of experience with Ebola, delayed identification, geographical and 
demographic characteristics contributed to the scale of The Epidemic. A high number of 
infected health workers were observed with many potential risk factors, both in and outside 
work settings. This undermined the overall response to The Epidemic. Preventative measures 
aim to break subsequent chains of transmission. These were challenging during The 
Epidemic, contributing to the scale. 
!
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF)  
VHF is a syndrome caused by several different RNA-viruses (1) with some common features: 
humans are not the natural reservoir for these viruses primarily due to high mortality rates. A 
virus is dependent on a living organism in order to replicate its genome. The host of VHF 
viruses is an animal or insect and when in direct contact with humans or non-human primates 
the virus may be transmitted. Human-human transmission occurs from an infected individual 
to another (2). Human outbreaks are also difficult to predict since they occur only 
sporadically. Geographical distribution is usually restricted to the areas inhabited by these 
species (3). 
Table 1 provides an overview of the five different families of viruses known to cause VHF in 
humans with their animal host, example of virus and example of VHF (4). 
 
Family  Animal host  Example of virus  Example of VHF  
Arenaviridae  Rodents  Lassa virus  Lassa fever 




Paramyxovirida Fruit bats  Mumps, measles and Hendra 
virus  
Hendra virus disease 
Flaviviridae  Arthropods  Yellow fever virus, dengue 
virus  
Yellow fever, dengue fever  
Filoviridae  Fruit bats Marburg and Ebola virus  Ebola Virus Disease  
Table 1. Overview of the 5 families that are known to cause VHF, their animal hosts, with example of virus and 
the disease they cause (4). 
 
A common pathophysiological feature is damage to the vascular system that facilitates 
capillary leakage. Furthermore VHF impairs the body’s ability to regulate basic functions, 
such as blood pressure (5). Clinically VHF poses a diagnostic challenge because symptoms 
vary from mild to life threatening. The severity differs from the one disease to another, but 
also between patients (5). Generally, a patient with VHF has an abrupt onset of fever, myalgia 
and headache followed by vomiting and diarrhoea. Thereafter signs of haemorrhage may 




Although outbreaks usually are restricted to local rural areas with large impacts on local 
communities, VHF also constitutes an international challenge through import of these 
infections and also as their potential as weapons in biological warfare (6)
The Ebola virus is an archetype of the viral haemorrhagic viruses because it demonstrates all 
the points made above. The virus is one of the most virulent organisms known and has an 
ability to cause profound disease in mankind with case-fatality rates up to 90%. Therefore it’s 
also classified as a biothreat pathogen category A(7)  
 
1.2 Purpose  
An outbreak of Ebola in late 2013 became an epidemic, with the most substantial impact 
caused by this virus the world has ever seen. This epidemic will therefore also be the focus of 
this thesis. The overall objective is to provide an overview of different aspects of the 
epidemic. It will attempt to provide certain explanations that contributed to the unprecedented 
scale. A review all problems that occurred would be impossible due its magnitude and 
complexity. On that note there are some research questions that needs to be answered: 
 
1. What distinguishes this outbreak from the previous epidemics, with a specific focus on its 
origin, spread, demographic and ecological contributors. This will include an overview of 
previous epidemics. 
2. One particularly serious feature in this epidemic was the substantial number of infected 
health care workers. How were the features and contributing factors?  
3. What are some of the key elements to stop an Ebola outbreak and how are they 
conducted?  
 
1.3 Taxonomy  
In order to understand fundamental pathophysiology, treatment options and vaccine 
development it’s essential to possess some fundamental knowledge of how the Ebola virus is 
structured.  
1.3.1 Classification + the story about how Ebola got its name.  
Yambuku is a small village northern Democratic republic of the Congo and is the place where 
Ebola was discovered in 1976. The discovery was followed by a discussion about what name 
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to give the virus. Dr. Peter Piot, one of the co-discoverers of Ebola discusses this in his book 
“No time to lose (8).” When the Lassa virus was discovered in 1969 it was named after the 
place of discovery. This was also an option now, but the research team decided on another 
option because they did not wish for the village to become a symbol of catastrophe (as had 
happened with the Lassa virus). Therefore, it was suggested to name the virus after the closest 
river. Apparently the Ebola river was the nearest to Yambuku. In local language Ebola means 
“black river”. In the end it turned out that the map that had been used was inaccurate. The 
Ebola river wasn’t the closest river, but the name had already been given and has persisted 
ever since(8)
Ebola is a member of the Filoviridae family, with three viruses being classified in this family: 
namely the Ebola virus, Cuevavirus and Marburg virus. The name filoviridae has its origin 
from the Latin word filum, meaning “thread-like” (9). Under an electron microscope 
filoviriradae have a thread-like appearance.  
There are 5 known species of the Ebola virus, namely Zaire, Sudan, Tai Forest, Bundubugyo 
and Reston(10). The first 4 will cause profound disease in humans(11)
1.3.2 Structure and genetics  
Ebola is an enveloped, non-segmented single stranded negative sense RNA virus (12). The 
capsid coats the genetic material (RNA) and is formed by individual protein molecules called 
capsomeres. The nucleic acid together with the capsid is called nucleocapsid.  
The Ebola virus has also an outer lipid membrane derived from the host cell, this is called the 
envelope. The envelope has attached viral glycoproteins.  
 
The shape may vary from long filaments to shorter filaments formed like a “6” or “U”, a 
biological feature known as pleomorphism. The strands measure from about 80 nanometres 
up to 14 000 nm. The RNA genome has a helical shape and 19000 nucleotides form the 
genome with seven structural proteins as end products(9). They are in following order:  3’ 
leader, nucleoprotein (NP), virion protein 35 (VP), VP 40, glycoprotein (GP)/soluble GP, VP 
30, VP 24, RNA-dependent RNA-polymerase, 5’ trailer (9, 13).
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The ribonucleoprotein complex is formed by the RNA genome and is encapsulated by 
nucleoprotein that forms the capsid. VP35, VP30 and RNA-polymerase associate with the 
genome and capsid to form the nucleocapsid structures.  
 
Viral VP 40 and 24 are matrix proteins responsible for structural integrity. VP 40 is involved 
in viral budding. VP 24 has an important role in IFN-supression. The only surface protein is 
Glycoprotein (GP). Glycoproteins are proteins with carbohydrate groups attached to their 
chain. In the Ebola virus GP has a trimeric appearance. An enzyme called protein convertase 
furin (from the host) makes different subunits of glycoprotein. GP1 facilitates attachment to 
the host cells, whereas GP2 is responsible for fusion of the membranes. A third GP, known as 
soluble GP is secreted in large amount from infected cells (9, 14). Table 2 provides with a 
summary of the viral proteins and their functions.  
 
Viral protein  Function  
Nucleoprotein  Forms the capsid of the virus  
VP 35  Non-structural protein. IFN antagonist  
VP 40  Matrix protein between capsid and envelope. Involved 
in viral budding (particle formation) 
GP  Surface protein.  
GP1: attachement  
GP2: fusion of membranes  
VP 30  Non-structural protein  
VP 24 Matrix protein between capsid and envelope. 
Suppresses IFN-production  
RNA-polymerase L  RNA-polymerase  
  
Table 2: A summary of the different viral proteins and their functions. 
 
1.4 Life cycle    
1.4.1 Entry of the host cell  
Viruses are distinct from living organisms because they are dependent on a host in order to 
replicate. The first step in this process is therefore the entrance into the host cell. The exact 
entry mechanism for the Ebola virus into the host cell is only partially understood. As 
mentioned earlier GP facilitates anchoring and entry, but exact how is unknown (9, 13).  
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However, viruses similar to the Ebola virus enter their host cell through endocytosis, this is a 
process where viral particles are engulfed and released into the cytoplasm of the cell.  
Different modes of endocytosis have been identified and different viruses depend on different 
routes (9, 13). 
 
Clathrin-mediated endocytosis is a well understood endoctic mechanism. Invagination of the 
plasma membrane occurs in specific areas of the cell membrane called clathrin coated pits. 
Another route of endocytosis is Caveolin-mediated endocytosis and takes place in parts of the 
plasma membrane rich in cholesterol (lipid rafts) and caveolin protein with a flask shaped 
invagination of the plasma membrane. Disturbance in cell membrane cholesterol reduces the 
viruses abilities to enter the cell (13) . Earlier studies have suggested that the Zaire strain of 
Ebola virus uses the clathrin route (15) or the caveolin route (16). This has been disproven in 
a later study conducted by dr. Saeed and his team (13). The same study showed results that 
indicate that Zaire Ebola virus most likely enters the cell through micropinoctyosis in 
HEK293T and Vero cells. This is supported by the fact that inhibiton of proregulators of 
macropinocytosis limits viral entry and infection. Dr. Saaed points out that its unknown if the 
viruses uses macropincotyosis in other cells, but argues that this is an endocytic mechanism 
that most cells possess. Furthermore this study proved that after cell entry virus trafficking 
was facilitated through endosomes, but where the release of the nucleic acid occurs is still 
uncertain (13).  
 
1.4.2 Ebola virus transcription  
With the Ebola virus being a negative sense RNA-virus, conversion to a positive strand of 
viral RNA is necessary before translation. RNA polymerase aids the conversion to the 
positive strand within the cell. Thereafter translation of mRNA is facilitated and viral proteins 
are produced. 
 
1.5 Ebola virus disease (EVD)  
1.5.1 Viral reservoirs  
The widest accepted theory is that fruit bats serve as a natural host for the Ebola virus. An 
appropriate natural reservoir is able to live with the infection and not die from it. If the natural 
reservoir dies from the viral infection, the virus would die out. In other words: if Ebola was to 
be fatal in bats they could not serve as a reservoir and the virus is therefore persistent in the 
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bats. Infected bats can transmit the virus to other animals such as apes, but also to humans. 
Human infection usually occurs after contact with infected (that are either sick or dead) 
animals like gorillas, chimpanzees, porcupines that are found in the forest(17, 18). After an 
infected individual develops symptoms of EVD human-human transmission may occur. 
Figure 1 illustrates how Ebola virus ecology and transmission takes place. 
 
Figure 1. An overview of Ebola Ecology and transmission (11) 
 
1.5.2 Modes of transmission  
Two factors determine the likelihood of human-human transmission: 
1. The type of infectious medium  
2.  The viral load in that medium.  
When secretions infected with Ebola come in direct contact with a broken skin barrier and/or 
mucous membranes human-human transmission arises. Blood, faeces and vomit are examples 
of infectious secretions that are also the most infectious. The virus may also be found in 
breast milk, saliva, semen and tears. Indirect transmission occurs through contaminated 
surfaces and objects, e.g. linens (19). Traditional burial rituals where the mourners are direct 
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contact with the deceased have contributed to the extensive transmission seen in the local 
communities(17). As an example 85 confirmed Ebola cases were linked to one funeral 
ceremony in Guinea (20). 
 
Ebola as a sexual transmitting disease 
Studies have shown that the Ebola virus can persist in male semen up to 9 months after onset 
of symptoms.  This has started a discussion about the virus’ ability to be transmitted sexually. 
However this exact mode of transmission is still uncertain (21). 
 
1.5.3 Pathophysiology  
After viral entry into the human body, macrophages and dendritic cells are probably the first 
cells to be infected. When Ebola replicates in these cells it causes apoptosis and thereby the 
release of new viral particles in the extracellular fluid occur. Table 2 illustrates that at least 
two viral proteins have the ability to interfere with IFN I responses: VP 35 is and IFN 
antagonist and VP 24 supresses IFN production. This facilitates rapid systemic spread (22). 
Replication in regional lymph nodes results in dissemination to liver, spleen, thymus and 
other lymphoid tissues. Multifocal necrosis in liver and spleen is a fatal stage of this process 
(23).   
 
As a response to infection the infected cells of the body produce systemic inflammatory 
cytokines and other proinflammatory mediators. Infected macrophages produce TNF-a, IL-1b, 
IL-6 as well as NO (nitric oxide). This cascade causes substantial damage. It is thought to be 
one of the leading causes of gastrointestinal (GI) dysfunction and is known to cause capillary 
leakage. Another theory for GI dysfunction is viral infection of the GI tracts. Capillary 
leakage lays a foundation for a process known as extravasation meaning that the leucocytes 
migrate out of the blood vessels towards the site of infection. However in EVD soluble 
glycoproteins released form virus infected cells prohibit extravasation and therefore also 
interfere with the immune system’s ability for viral attack (24). Furthermore the leukocytes 
that are stuck in the vessels release proinflammatory cytokines leading to further damage to 
the blood vessels and also stimulations of the coagulation cascade. The leakage from the 
capillaries to the interstitial space is harmful because it leads to loss of blood volume and 
development of hypotension and in worst-case scenario hypotensive shock.
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Another important pathophysiological feature is Ebola’s ability to cause coagulation defects. 
Infected macrophages synthesize tissue factor (TF) leading to activation of the extrinsic 
coagulation pathway. Additionally, the proinflammatory cytokines trigger the macrophages to 
produce TF. This leads to the development of coagulopathy, a coagulopathy of consumption 
since the stimulation of the coagulation pathway leads to thrombosis and the consumption of 
the coagulation factors leads to bleeding. At later stages hepatic failure may also lead to 
declined production of certain coagulation factors. 
 
A central event when battling infections is the enablement of the adaptive immunity and 
subsequent antibody production. In EVD, this process in impaired. The dendritic cells (DC) 
are one of the primary cells in which Ebola replicates. They are also the cells responsible for 
antigen presentation to naive B-lymphocytes and therefore essential in the initiation of 
adaptive immune responses. Studies have shown that the dendritic cells are unable to mature 
and therefore also incapable to serve as antigen presenting cells in people dying from Ebola. 
Simultaneously, survivors have early and increasing levels of IgG directed against NP and 
VP40 (25, 26). A deadly EVD infection also leads to apoptosis of lymphocytes leading to 
further impairment of adaptive immunity. This phenomenon is possibly induced by the 
inflammatory mediators and/loss of stimulation from the DC (23, 27). 
 
1.5.4 Symptoms and clinical findings 
Figure 2 illustrates how EVD progresses in humans. After an incubation period of 2-21 days 
an infected patient will start to develop fever, headache, fatigue and myalgia (28). Subsequent 
symptoms are vomiting, watery diarrhoea, chest pain, coughing with declining liver and renal 
functions. 5-7 days after onset of symptoms, signs of haemorrhage may develop.  Common 
manifestations include bloody stools, petechiae, ecchymoses, mucosal bleedings and oozing 
from venepuncture sites. Simultaneously with the haemorrhagic symptoms a diffuse 
erythematous, nonpruritic maculopapular rash may arise. Predilection areas include the face, 
neck, truncus and arms. A progressive stage of the disease includes shock and DIC (14, 17, 
28-30). An end stage illness is characterised by the development of meningoencephalitis with 





Figure 2: A Demonstration of the clinical course of EVD in humans (32) 
Especially two clinical features were distinguishable compared to symptoms in previous 
epidemics:  
1. Traditionally, severe haemorrhage was one of the dreaded and serious complications, 
thus naming the disease “Ebola haemorrhagic fever.” However, during the latest epidemic 
fatal haemorrhage was less prominent. Consequently the name changed to “Ebola virus 
disease.”  
2.  Vomiting and diarrhoea was recognised as two symptoms that contributed to more severe 
illness than previously acknowledged. This was due to large volume losses and electrolyte 
disturbances(33).  
 
1.5.5 Diagnosis and laboratory findings  
The initial symptoms of EVD are non-specific and resemble many other illnesses more 
common, e.g. Malaria. However it's a diagnosis one should always keep in mind especially in 
people with connection to Central and West Africa. Viral detection may be done the by 
following investigations:  
• Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR)  
• Antibody-capture enzyme linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA)  
• Electron microscopy  
• Virus isolation by cell culture (17)
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A typical biochemical picture in a patient with EVD is leukopenia, thrombocytopenia and 
transaminase elevations. Electrolyte abnormalities like hyponatremia, 
hypokalemia/hyperkalemia, hypomagnesemia and hypokalsemia are common. At later stages 
coagulation abnormalities consistent with DIC are manifest (17, 30).  
 
1.5.6 Disease course and recovery  
In Ebola survivors, clinically improvement is typically seen during the second week of illness. 
Patients with fatal illness tend to present with more severe signs and symptoms in the early 
stage of the disease. Progression to multi-organ failure and death occurs on a general basis 
when the survivors tend to improve, i.e. during the second week of illness. The recovery time 
after surviving EVD is long lasting and may continue for more than two years. Common 
complaints include fatigue, headache and problems with regaining weight. Acute arthralgia, 
retro-orbital pain, uveitis, hearing loss and different skin conditions are not uncommon. Some 
symptoms may be more serious than others. Different postulations have been made on reasons 
for these symptoms. Some have suggested that a higher viral load in early stage of disease 





2. Materials and Methods  
This thesis provides an overview of different events that occurred during the 2013-2016 West 
African Epidemic that contributed to it scale. It is based on relevant literature retrieved from 
PubMed, WHO and CDC documents retrieved at their respective websites as well as 
information given to me by my supervisor Ørjan Olsvik.  
 
2.1 Definitions (34) 
Incidence: the rate of occurrence of a disease stated as the number of new cases of the 
disease in a given population in a given time.  
Prevalence: Presence/occurrence, i.e. the fraction of a given population that has a given 
disease at a certain point.  
Endemic: A communicable disease that over a longer time period is restricted to a certain 
geographic area or population.  
Epidemic: WHO has defined an epidemic as the following: “The occurrence in a community 
or region of cases of an illness, specific health-related behaviour, or other health-related 
events clearly in excess of normal expectancy. The community or region and the period in 
which the cases occur are specified precisely. The number of cases indicating the presence of 
an epidemic varies according to the agent, size and type of population exposed, previous 
experience or lack of exposure to the disease, and time and place of occur.” (35) 
Pandemic: An epidemic so widely spread that vast numbers of people in different countries 
and even continents are affected. WHO has defined a six-phased pandemic classification 
system. It is mainly used to describe influenza pandemics, but it is applicable for other 
epidemics too. The six phases are:  
• Phase 1: No animal (influenza) virus circulating among animals has been reported to 
cause infection in humans  
• Phase 2: An animal (influenza) virus circulating in domesticated or wild animals is 
known to have caused infection in humans and is therefore considered a specific 
potential pandemic threat.  
• Phase 3: An animal or human-animal (influenza reassortant) virus has caused sporadic 
cases or small clusters of disease in people, but has not resulted in human-human 
transmission sufficient to sustain community level outbreaks  
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• Phase 4: Human- to- human transmission of an (animal or human-animal- influenza 
reassortant) virus able to sustain community- level outbreaks has been verified.  
• Phase 5: The same identified virus has caused sustained community level outbreaks in 
two or more countries in one WHO region.  
• Phase 6: In addition to the criteria in phase 5, the same virus has caused sustained 
community level outbreaks in at least one other country in another WHO region (36).  
Outbreak: More cases than expected of a given disease restricted to a geographic area in a 
limited timeframe or ≥ 2 cases of the same disease with presumed common source of 
infection  
Lethality: An expression for the seriousness of a given disease, i.e. the fraction of those with 
a given disease that die as a result of the disease.  
Mortality: Death rate, the number of deaths in a defined population during a given time.  
Reproduction rate (R0): Is a measure to calculate how many people a person with a 
communicable disease will transmit the disease to during his/hers time of illness in a totally 
susceptible population (no immunity). In other words: the number of secondary cases per 
case.  If R0 <1 the illness will burn out, R0 >1 the disease will continue to spread and if R0 = 1 
the disease will stay endemic (37).  
Health worker: All those who work in health services, including drivers, cleaners, burial 
teams and community based workers and clinical staff (38).  
2.2 WHO classification of EVD cases  
Classification  Criteria  
Suspected Any person, alive or dead who has (or had) sudden 
onset of high fever and had contact with a suspected, 
probable or confirmed Ebola case, or a dead or sick 
animal OR any person with sudden onset of high fever 
and at least three of the following symptoms: 
headache, vomiting, anorexia/loss of appetite, 
diarrhoea, lethargy, stomach pain, aching muscles or 
joints, difficulty swallowing, breathing difficulties, or 
hiccup; or any person with unexplained bleeding OR 
any sudden, unexplained death  
 
Probable Any suspected case evaluated by a clinician OR any 
person who died from “suspected” Ebola and had an 
epidemiological link to a confirmed case but was not 
tested and did not have laboratory confirmation of the 
disease  
 
Confirmed  A probable or suspected case is classified as 
confirmed when a sample from that person tests 
positive for Ebola virus in the laboratory.  
Table 1. WHO definition of EVD cases (38).   
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2.3 Search strategy, selection criteria for the literature  
The aim was to find literature on the problems mentioned in the introduction. Publications on 
these problems were therefore also the inclusion criteria for this thesis. Since there were 
several problems I wanted to review I found it appropriate to preform separate searches for 
each problem that is to be highlighted. All relevant literature had to cover the West African 
Ebola epidemic of 2014-2016. A combination of literature obtained from the search engine 
PubMed, WHO publications and published CDC documents were the foundation for this 
thesis. The search for literature was conducted from March 2018-end of April 2018. Although 
separate searches for literature for each problem was preformed, some common features can 
be identified:  
1. For each problem separate literature search in PubMed was preformed as well as 
retrieving relevant WHO and CDC documents from their respective websites. Relevant 
articles may also have been included after screening reference lists of other articles.  
2. In order to narrow down the number of articles some inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
made:  
a. Documents must regard the 2014-2016 epidemic only, except when retrieving 
information regarding previous epidemics  
b. Studies written in other languages than English were excluded 
c. Documents not available in free full text through University of Tromsø’s online 
access or retrieved from my supervisor was also excluded 
3. After the literature searches were completed, the search results were scanned and screened 
by reading the title.   
4. Articles with relevant title were further screened for relevancy by reading the abstract.  
5. The articles were added to the digital reference handling medium EndNote X8.  
 
2.3.1 Epidemiological features  
A search was conducting in the search engine PubMed in the beginning of April 2018. A 
combination of the following search terms was used: “Ebola virus disease” “Africa” “West 
Africa ““epidemiology” “epidemiological features” and “2014”. Filters used were “abstract,” 
“free full text” and time period 01.01.14-01.01.18. Four additional articles were included after 
screening reference lists. In Addition CDC has published an overview of previous epidemics 
that is the foundation for that part of this text. WHO published a one-year report where 
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several important factors are discussed and included in this report. In total 8 articles are 
included in addition to the CDC publication.  
 
2.3.2 Ebola in Health Workers  
The intention was to find relevant literature on the amount of infected health workers and the 
reasons for this. A search in PubMed with the following combinations was made: Ebola in 
health personnel, Ebola virus disease in health personnel, Ebola in health worker, Ebola virus 
disease in health workers. PubMed allows you put on filters in order to customize the search:  
1. Text availability: Here I chose to put on the filter for abstract and free full text, as this 
was a requirement for this paper.  
2. Publication dates: was in this thesis limited to 01.01.2014-31.12.2017.  
The search terms were all added to the builder in PubMed with the word “OR” in between. 
This resulted in 22 articles. 5 articles found to be relevant after screening the titles and 
abstracts. One article was excluded after reading the whole article due to irrelevancy. In 
addition one WHO publication on this subject was included as well as two articles after 
studying the reference list of the included articles. In total, 7 articles were included.  
 
2.3.3 Infection control  
The aim was to identify some important strategies to prevent/reduce transmission of EVD. 
This is a complex process and it would be impossible to discuss all aspects in this thesis. 
However, after discussion with my supervisor we decided on some strategies that would be 
suitable to discuss (these will be presented later). One previously used source was found to be 
suitable again. Furthermore, both WHO and CDC have published many documents and 
guidelines on the chosen topics. All these publications are fully available at their online 
website. One article published in Lancet was accessed through the WHO website.  
Some points are also based on personal communication between my supervisor Ørjan Olsvik 
and myself. In total, 8 references were included in this part.   
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3. Results  
3.1 Epidemiological features of the 2014-2016 West African Epidemic  
3.1.1 Previous outbreaks  
Table 3 provides an overview of all epidemics up until 2013 (39). Ebola was first identified in 
1976 by two temporal related, but separate outbreaks. One was caused by the Zaire strain of 
Ebola virus (EBOV) and occurred in the town of Yambuku in The democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). 318 cases with 218 deaths were identified (Case fatality rate, CFR 88%). The 
other was caused by the Sudan strain and affected 284 people of whom 151 died (CFR 53%). 
Up until 2013 there have been 21 identified outbreaks in addition to the two first. Zaire and 
Sudan Ebola virus have been the causative strains in the majority of outbreaks, with 12 and 7 
outbreaks respectively (39).  
 
The countries that previously have experienced EBOV outbreaks are located in central Africa. 
DRC, South Sudan, Congo, Gabon and Uganda have had multiple outbreaks. A two case 
outbreak occurred in South Africa in 1996. The Ivory Coast has had 1 case that occurred in a 
zoologist that had preformed an autopsy on a chimpanzee. Studies showed that the strain was 
of Tai forest type (39-41).   
  
Prior to 2013, outbreaks have been of lesser size with only 7 cases affecting > 100 people. 
The largest epidemic before 2013 was in Uganda in year 2000. The causative agent was 
Sudan Ebola virus with 425 identified cases. However, with 224 deaths lethality (53%) was 
significantly lower than previous epidemics (39).  
 
In an article Shears and O’Dempsey classify the previous outbreaks in three groups: 1. 
Outbreaks occurring in remote forest areas, linked directly to bush meat consumption and 
usually with few cases. 2. Those centred around and within regional hospitals with 
considerable hospital transmission, spreading into the community. 3. Those occurring in 
populated rural areas, with mainly hospital transmission but some transmission in local health 
facilities (42). What all the previous outbreaks have in common is that they have been time-






Country  Town  Cases  Deaths  Species  Year  
DRC Yambuku 318 280 Zaire  1976 
South Sudan Nzara 284 151 Sudan 1976 
DRC Tandala 1 1 Zaire 1977 
South Sudan Nzara 34 22 Sudan 1979 
Gabon Mekouka 52 31 Zaire 1994 
Ivory Coast Tai Forest 1 0 Taï Forest 1994 
DRC Kikwit 315 250 Zaire 1995 
Gabon Mayibout 37 21 Zaire 1996 
Gabon Booue 60 45 Zaire 1996 
South Africa Johannesburg 2 1 Zaire 1996 
Uganda Gulu 425 224 Sudan 2000 
Gabon Libreville  65 53 Zaire 2001 
Republic of 
Congo 
Not Specified 57 43 Zaire 2001 
Republic of 
Congo 
Mbomo 143 128 Zaire 2002 
Republic of 
Congo 
Mbomo 35 29 Zaire 2003 
South Sudan Yambio 17 7 Sudan 2004 
DRC Luebo 264 187 Zaire 2007 
Uganda Bundibugyo 149 37 Bundibugyo 2007 
DRC Luebo 32 15 Zaire 2008 
Uganda  Luwero District 1 1 Sudan 2011 
Uganda Kibaale district  11* 4* Sudan 2012  
DRC Isiro Health 
Zone 
36* 13* Bundibugyo 2012 
Uganda  Luweo District  6* 3* Sudan 2012  
Multiple  Multiple  28652 11325 Zaire 2014-2016 
*Numbers reflect laboratory confirmed cases only  
Table 1: An overview of all known epidemics up to 2014 (39) 
 
3.1.2 2013-2016 West African epidemic: Geographic origin and spread  
In a one-year report by WHO it was described that “A mysterious disease began silently 
spreading in a small village in Guinea on December 26th 2013”(43). In March 2014 WHO 
was notified of this disease where patients presented with fever, severe diarrhoea, vomiting 
and high fatality rate. Baize et al. conducted a virologic investigation and identified Zaire 
EBOV as the causative agent for this mysterious disease (40). Figure 1 is a timeline that 




An epidemiological investigation was conducted and the index case was identified as a 2-year 
old boy in Meliandou in Guéckédou prefecture (40, 43). This is a small, rural village in a 
forested region of Guinea(43). The initial investigation conducted by Baize et al. indicated 
that the boy fell ill in the beginning of December 2013 and died a few days later. The 
following investigation revealed that the death of the index case was dated to the end of 
December 2013 (40). The exact source of infection remains uncertain (43), but a tree infested 
with fruit bats was the boy’s play ground (44).  
 
In the beginning of January 2014 close family members (sister, mother, grandmother) of the 
index case developed similar symptoms and died rapidly. These symptoms were also 
observed in midwives, traditional healers and hospital staff in Guéckédou who treated them. 
In the week after, extended family members of the index case who attended funerals or who 
cared for sick relatives became ill and died (43). By February 1st 2014 the virus had reached 
Guinea’s capital, Conakry by an infected extended family member of the index case’s family. 
Adequate precaution measures weren’t implemented, as EVD wasn’t a diagnosis anyone had 
experienced in this region. By the end of February cases spread to other regions, villages and 
cities in Guinea (43).  
 
During March 2014 the disease had spread further in Guinea and the first reports of cases in 
Liberia occurred (40, 43, 45). The first cases occurred in the Lofa County, close to the 
Guinean border. By April 7th 2014 Liberia had 21 confirmed, probable and suspected cases 
with 10 deaths (43). In their one-year report WHO refer to a retrospective study that traced 
down the first case in Sierra Leone to a woman that had been a guest at the home of the index 
case in Meliandou, Guinea. She travelled back home to Sierra Leone when the host family 
became ill and she died in the beginning of January 2014. No report or investigation followed 
this death (43). From the end of May-beginning of June 2014 an exponential growth of cases 
was noted in Sierra Leone. These cases were traced back to a traditional healer in a village in 
Kailahun district close to the Guinean border. Guinean Ebola patients crossed the border to be 
treated by this healer and transmission occurred.  
 
The burial of the healer was followed by a domino effect of more cases, deaths and funerals. 
Consequently, 365 cases were traced back to that single funeral. Freetown, the capital of 
Sierra Leone experienced the first confirmed case on June 23rd (43). Figure 2 below is a map 
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of all the districts in the three countries that were most affected by Ebola (45). By July 2014 
case counts were increasing, and The Epidemic had reached several towns and the three 
capitals of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, namely Conakry, Monrovia and Freetown (45).  
 
On August 8th 2014 WHO declared the epidemic to be a “public health emergency of 
international concern”(45). The Epidemic spread further to other African countries and also 
to Europe and The United States. In total, 36 cases of Ebola were reported from Italy, Mali, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States (41, 44). From late 
autumn 2014 case counts started to decline, but cases were still identified throughout 2015. 
The Epidemic was declared to be over in March 2016 with 28 652 cases, 11 325 deaths and 

















































Figure 2. Districts affected by EVD in Three countries in Africa. The map shows the districts that have been 
affected by EVD in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Grey circles indicate the total numbers of confirmed an 
probable cases reported in each affected district, and red circles the number reported during the 21 days leading 
up to September 14th, 2014 (45)  
 
3.1.2 Distinguishing features of the 2013-2016 West African Ebola Epidemic  
From the events described above, one can identify several features that differentiate the 2013-
2016 West African Ebola Epidemic from the previous epidemics up until 2013.  
 
The 2013-2016 Epidemic outranked all previous outbreaks in cases, survivors, deaths and 
duration. It was 67 times the size of the Uganda outbreak of 2000, which was the largest 
outbreak up until 2013 (44). Previous epidemics were mainly located in central Africa and 
mostly in rural areas. Many of these countries have experienced several outbreaks (table 1). 
The 2013-2016 Epidemic was mainly localised to three countries in West Africa but other 
African countries like Nigeria and Senegal also reported cases of Ebola. For the first time a 
trans-continental spread by air travel to Europe and the United States took place and thus 
involving developed nations. None of these countries had experienced Ebola before. The 
epicentre for the outbreak was localised to the countryside a massive spread to more 
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populated areas and major cities including all three capitals of the three most affected 
countries was seen (41, 43-45).  
 
3.1.3 Viral origin and contributing factors from an ecological, environmental and 
demographic perspective  
When the virus materialised in West Africa, the question about its origin was raised. In the 
study conducted by Baize et al. a phylogenetic analysis of the gene sequence of the EBOV 
strain was preformed. It revealed that the strain causative for the 2013-2016 Epidemic was 
similar and closely related to other EBOV strains, but not identical to those responsible for 
outbreaks in The Democratic republic of the Congo (DRC) and Gabon. These findings 
indicate that the virus has evolved in parallel with the strains from DRC and Gabon from a 
common ancestor instead of being introduced into Guinea. Fruit bats are common in large 
parts of West Africa (40).   
 
The epicentre for the 2013-2016 West African Ebola Epidemic was in the Forest Region of 
Guinea. The region has experienced a forest loss > 80% due to foreign mining and timber 
operations. This has brought the bats in closer contact with the humans. Before symptom 
debut the index case was playing close to a tree infested with bats (43). Forest loss as a 
contributing factor for human exposure to bats is posed as a source of infection in the 
available literature (43, 46, 47) 
 
The populations in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone are highly mobile both within their 
countries and across the three national borders. Population mobility in this area is 7 times 
higher than other countries in the world (43). Boarders between the West African countries 
could be crossed easily and there were convenient connections between villages, rural towns 
and national capitals (41, 43, 45-47). Furthermore, for the first time the introduction of Ebola 
to different population occurred through air travel, for instance in both Lagos Nigeria and 
Dallas Texas.  
 
Another contributing factor that has been pointed out in the literature is West Africa’s lack of 
experience with Ebola. Hospital staff had never treated EVD cases before, the laboratories 
had never analysed patient samples. Ebola as causative agent wasn’t on the radar when 
patients with mysterious symptoms first were reported (43). Many other diseases that are 
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endemic to this region can present with similar symptoms as EVD. Lassa fever, a Viral 
Haemorrhagic fever (VHF) endemic to the region and was a more likely diagnosis (41, 43). 
Cholera is also prevalent in West Africa, and in early stages EVD and Cholera resemble each 
other. A one-year outbreak of Cholera was seen in Guinea and Sierra Leone in 2012. Cholera 
was therefore not an unlikely diagnosis. Microscopic examinations of patient samples 
examined by a team including staff from Mediciniers Sans Frontiers (MSF) revealed bacteria 
and the hypothesis of Cholera as causative agent was strengthened. This was in late January-
beginning February 2014. No final conclusion was drawn at that time and further 
investigations were conducted. Ebola virus, Zaire species as causative agent was identified in 
late March 2014. An outbreak was announced on WHO website March 23rd 2014. By that 
time 49 cases and 29 deaths were officially reported (43).  
 
3.2 Infected health workers   
3.2.1 Epidemiology and demographics   
A WHO report revealed that from January 1st 2014 to March 31st 2015, 815 probable and 
confirmed health worker EVD cases were recorded in VHF database. Sierra Leona, Liberia 
and Guinea were the three countries where The Epidemic had the most substantial impact 
with 328, 288 and 199 cases of EVD in health worker in each country respectively. 225 
additional suspected cases were reported, but not included in the WHO report. In this time 
frame health workers accounted for 3.9% of all confirmed and probable cases reported. As a 
proportion of all monthly number of cases, health worker infections peaked in July 2014 at 

























Figure 3. Number of confirmed and probable health worker EVD cases over time (and proportion of health 
worker cases among cases* reported) in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone combined, January 1st 2014 – March 
31st 2015 (38). 
 
Of the infected health workers, 61% were males. The males represented 95% of the medical 
workers (table 6, annex 1 (38)), 88% of the laboratory workers, 77% of the trade and 
elementary workers and 45% of the nurse workers that were infected. In the report the health 
workforce databases have been researched revealing that males were disproportionally 
affected with the male: female ratio being 1.6:1. Based on occupation, nurses, nurse assistants 
and nurse aides accounted for > 50% of all health worker infections. Medical workers 
accounted for 12%, whereas laboratory workers 7%, elementary workers (janitors, 
maintenance staff etc.) 7%(38). In Guinea doctors were significantly more affected by EVD 
compared to Sierra Leone and Liberia (38, 48). Depending on the health profession, the risk 
of EVD infection was between 21-32 times higher in health workers compared with non-
health workers ≥ 15 years of age (38).  
 
When comparing health workers to non-health workers 77% of health workers where 
hospitalized compared to 62% of non-health worker ≥ 15 years old (p<0.01) (38). When 
comparing the time from symptom onset to isolation in these two groups, a report from 
Guinea didn’t show any discrepancy (48).  
 
A total of 6 out of 7 included articles report that most of the infected health workers worked 
in other facilities than dedicated Ebola Treatment Units (ETU’s) (48-52). This is illustrated by 
a Morbidity and Mortality weekly report published by the CDC: From June 9th –August 14th 
2014 97 cases of Ebola were identified among health workers in Liberia, 62 (64%) of these 
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cases were part of 10 clusters of health workers working in non-ETU facilities. Seven of the 
ten clusters were associated with hospitals, one cluster included health workers in two clinics 
and a hospital and one patient visited all three locations during time of illness. The last two 
clusters were health workers working in two separate clinics. A total of 50 out of the 62 cases 
had confirmed Ebola with 31 identified deaths. Table 2 summarises the details. In this report 
one additional cluster was identified in health workers working in a dedicated Ebola facility 
(ETU) (49). The Kenema district in Sierra Leone experienced one of the biggest clusters of 
EVD cases in health workers that have been reported. From May 2014-January 2015 600 
EVD cases were uncovered, 92 were health worker infections. A majority of the health 
workers (66 cases) worked at Kenema Government Hospital, a hospital that prior to the 
outbreak served as national referral centre for Lassa fever with a dedicated ward that was 
turned into an ETU. In total, 18 of the 66 infected health workers worked in the ETU, whereas 
the 48 remaining persons held positions elsewhere in the hospital (52). Investigations 
preformed on a cluster of health workers working in en ETU and an adjacent hospital 
(Hospital A) in Liberia revealed EVD infection in 5 health workers. Three of the infected 
health workers worked in both the ETU and hospital A, the remaining two worked in the 
Emergency department of Hospital A (53).  
 
Characteristic  Number  
Total number of cases  62 
Confirmed cases (deaths)  50 (31) 
Health care workers per cluster  2-22 
(median =5)  
Clusters in health facilities that were not Ebola treatment units  10 
Hospitals with a cluster of Ebola among health care workers 8 
Clinics with a cluster of Ebola among health care workers  4  
Table 2: Characteristics of identified clusters of Ebola virus disease among 
health care workers in health care facilities that were not Ebola treatment units- 
Liberia, June 9th-August 14th, 2014 (49) 
 
 
For health workers with final outcome available, CFR was calculated in the WHO report. 
With 635 end results available and 418 death CFR was 2/3. This number was lower than for 
the rest of the population (non-health workers), but CFR showed also a variation between 
countries. In Guinea CFR amongst health workers was significantly lower than in Sierra 
Leona and Liberia. Guinea was also the country with the most complete data for that variable 
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(38). CFR was somewhat higher in females than in males, 68% to 65%, but the variable was 
not statistically significant (p=0.5)(38). 
 
 Olu et al conducted a retrospective descriptive study on health workers in Sierra Leone from 
May-December 2014. Almost half of the infected health workers believed that exposure had 
occurred in a hospital setting, 19% assumed exposure had taken place at home, 17.8% 
believed that exposure had occurred at health centres and 5.1% from other health facilities. 
Among those believing exposure had occurred at home, 41% reported physical contact with a 
family member, 20% reported contact with another health worker and 9% reported contact 
with a friend. In total 91% of the infected health workers reported contact with an EVD 
patient within the 21 days before symptom onset (51). The WHO report points out that 
transmission not unlikely occurred in the communities, outside hospital settings with or 
without providing care for EVD patients (38). A report from investigations conducted on 
health workers in Sierra Leone revealed that a significant number of health workers and non-
health workers had participated in funerals or been in contact with a corpse, but health 
workers were less likely to have attended funerals than non-health workers. Health workers 
were more likely to have been in contact with an Ebola patient 30 days prior to symptom 
onset than non-health workers (50). Data from investigations on health workers working in 
other facilities than ETU’s revealed that 60% of the Ebola cases occurred in health workers 
working at hospitals, but other treatment facilities also experienced health workers being 
infected with Ebola. In two of the described health worker-clusters health worker-EVD-
patients had prior to symptom onset provided care for infected patients in home settings (49). 
Another study conducted on health workers in Kenema, Sierra Leone described that 13% of 
the health workers contacts prior to their onset of symptoms were other patients and 27% 
were other infected colleagues. Some sporadic reports on health workers providing care for 
EVD patients at home without sufficient PPE were also described in the article (52).  
 
3.2.2 Possible risk factors and determinants for health worker infections in work 
settings  
Several determinants and risk factors that have contributed to health worker infections have 
been established. Most of them focus on problems that occurred at the work place. A 
summary is available in table 2. Several breaches in protocol were reported, some of the most 
common problems were: lack of/inadequate triage systems, insufficient Infection prevention 
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and control (IPC) training, no general IPC policies; including inadequate supervision and lack 
of equipment. Other problems that occurred commonly were infrastructural problems 
regarding physical space and layout (38, 49-53).   
 
Possible determinant  Details  
Administrative 
shortcomings  
Lack of or inappropriate point of care risk assessment  
• Cadaver exposure 
• Standard and transmission based (from blood and bodily 
fluid exposure) precautions not universally followed  
• No reassessment of admitted patients to identify new 
symptoms of Ebola  
• Delayed lab diagnosis of Ebola cases  
Problems with patient flows and zoning  
• Inadequate triage of Ebola patients and deceased patients 
• Inadequate control of Ebola patient or health worker 
movement within health facilities  
Lack of IPC staff and policies  
• Lack of standard operating procedures and clearly assigned 
responsibilities for IPC 
• Lack of IPC specialists  
Lack of supplies and training  
• Lack of/inadequate equipment, materials, training, 
monitoring of PPE use and decontamination  
• Limited capacity or inadequate training on safe management 
of contaminated waste  
• Limited capacity or inadequate training on the safe 
management and burial of the deceased  
Engineering and 
environmental controls  
Inadequate isolation and barriers  
• Inappropriate or inadequate isolation areas/setup 
• Lack of delineation between high-risk and low-risk Ebola 
zones 
• Inappropriate, inadequate or absent barrier nursing  
• Infrastructure limitations with lack of barriers separating 
general wards from Ebola patients  
• Limited availability of safe transport vehicles for patients and 
the deceased  
Lack of environmental controls  
• Poor hygiene and contaminated equipment and surfaces 
• Lack of or insufficient hand hygiene stations, soap, running 
water, alcohol-based hand rubs, chlorine/bleach/cleaning 
supplies, electricity, working waste disposal system  
PPE problems  
 
Insufficient/inadequate PPE and inappropriate use of it  
• Inconsistent use of PPE   
• Multiple use of disposable PPE   
• Health workers in hospital refusing to wear PPE while taking 
care of a relative  
Defective 
practices/exposure at 
the point of care  
 
 
• Inadequacies or inconsistencies in hand hygiene practises  
• Inadequacies or inconsistencies in biological specimen 
sampling 
• Needle stick injuries  
• Touching mucous membranes while wearing PPE  (e.g. 
rubbing eyes with contaminated glove)  
• Smoking while wearing PPE  
• Usage of mobile phone while wearing PPE  
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• Health worker providing care at home  
• Health worker embracing an ill colleague  
Employment 
conditions, social and 
environmental 
factors  
• Delayed and unpredictable remuneration 
• Staff shortages 
• Exhaustion (long working hours) 
• Psychosocial stress  
• Lack of social protection for illness  
Table 3. Possible determinants and risk factors of health worker infection during the 2013-2016 West- 
African Ebola Epidemic. The table is adapted from WHO with contribution from other reports (38, 49-53)  
 
3.3 Containment measures    
In the 9-month WHO report mentioned earlier the basic reproduction numbers were 
calculated to 1.71 for Guinea, 1.83 for Liberia and 2.02 for Sierra Leone. The total number of 
cases were estimated to pass 20 000 cases in total by the beginning of November 2014 if 
further strategies to prevent transmission weren’t implemented (45).  
 
In order to reduce/stop the transmission of EVD many tools are necessary, some features are 
summarised in figure 4. According to Ørjan Olsvik the keys to stop an outbreak are 
early/rapid detection of cases with subsequent admission to an ETU and safe burials. He also 
points out that sufficient hygiene and strict adherence to rules are essential (54). Another tool 
to prevent further person-person transmission is contact tracing (55). The 2013-2016 
Epidemic highlighted the need for research and as an example the results from a large vaccine 

















3.3.1 Structure of the ETU  
A triage area is located outside the ETU with a purpose to identify EVD patients(56). Patients 
with classical symptoms of EVD including bleeding from nose and mouth were isolated 
immediately (54). Surrounded by a fence, two zones constitute the ETU itself: the low-risk 
and high-risk zone. A double fence separates the high-risk zone from the low-risk zone. The 
low risk area is a staff area and contains changing area, storage, pharmacy etc. The high-risk 
area is divided into two areas: a suspected and a confirmed area. Only patients and health 
workers wearing PPE are allowed to enter the high-risk area. In the suspected area patients are 
tested for EVD. If the lab test is positive, the patient will be moved to the confirmed area. Is 
the test negative the patient is discharged and leaves through a special exit after disinfection. 
The flow in the ETU is designed for patients and staff to always move from low-risk to high-
risk area or from suspected to confirmed area. Once a patient enters the confirmed area there 
are two ways to leave it: through the confirmed area in the same fashion as in the suspected 
area or through the morgue. The morgue is always within the confirmed area with a safe exit. 
There is also a staff-designated exit in the high-risk area (56).   
Figure 5. Structure of an MSF ETU (57). 1: triage area, 2: Staff dressing room, 3: Ward for patients with low 
probability of Ebola, 4, 6, 8: Visitors area, 5: Ward for patients with high probability of Ebola, 7: Ward for 
patients with confirmed Ebola, 9: Morgue, 10: Entrance for patients with already identified Ebola, 11: 
Decontamination shower, 12: Undressing room for staff. Note that there is a slight between in the high- risk 
zones between the CDC explanation and MSF  
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3.3.2 Burials  
WHO has developed guidelines on how to conduct burials that are safe, but at the same time 
are respectful towards the deceased and those left behind. It's emphasised that only trained 
personnel should conduct the burials. The 12-step guideline describes the steps from prior to 
departure to the burial itself. The team typically consists of 8 people including members 
wearing full PPE, 1 sprayer, a communicator and a religious representative. The guidelines 
stress that informed consent always must be obtained before the burial can be conducted. 
Religious views should be respected to possible extent, and separate guidelines for Muslim 
and Christian patients are developed. The technical execution entails the wearing of PPE 
before contact with the remains, placement of the corpse in a body bag, environmental 
sanitation, transportation of the body bag to the cemetery and placement of the body into the 
grave. The community should also be involved in prayers at the burial site (58).   
 
3.3.3 Contact tracing  
WHO has defined contact tracing as “the process of identifying, assessing and managing 
people who have been exposed to a disease to prevent onward transmission (55).” Figure 5 
illustrates the relationship between Case Management and Contact tracing with basic 
principles for conduction. Infrastructure (alert system, ETU, laboratory etc.), personnel, 
resources and funding enable contact tracing. An Investigation Team conduct systematic 
interviews of potential EVD cases in order to reveal all possible contacts since symptom 
debut. The interview is conducted with the aim to identify all people who possibly have been 
exposed to transmission through the symptomatic patient. That includes  
People in which the case has had physical contact with, share household, visitors, places the 
contact has visited (included health care facilities and health workers in contact with the 
case). If the case is a health worker all patients must be listed. Relatives/next of kin should 
always be interviewed. A detailed procedure with specific instructions on how to conduct 
contact tracing is available in the WHO guidelines (55). Identified contacts are then asked 






























Figure 5: Relationship between Case Management 
 and Contact Tracing in the EVD Response (55).  
 
3.3.4 Vaccination  
During the 2013-2016 West African Ebola Epidemic research on possible vaccine candidates 
was conducted. A dozen different candidates underwent clinical development/trial, but only 
the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine completed stage III during the epidemic (59). 
On December 23rd 2016 WHO published a press release stating that rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine 
provides high protection against the disease (60).  
 
The results of this open-label, cluster-randomised trial conducted in Guinea and Sierra Leone 
were published in The Lancet. Contacts and contacts of contacts of a confirmed EVD case 
were defined as a cluster (ring). The clusters were then randomised to immediate vaccination 
or postponed vaccination at 21 days with 51 and 47 clusters, respectively. The pre-specified 
primary outcome was a laboratory confirmed case of EVD at 10 days or more from 
randomisation. The study then compared how many cases of Ebola that occurred in the 
immediate vs. the postponed vaccination group. An independent monitoring board 
recommended that the randomization should be stopped since immediate vaccination showed 
promising results. Consequently, immediate vaccination was offered to all identified rings, 
and children 6-17 years. No cases of EVD occurred 10 days or more after randomisation in 
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those assigned to immediate vaccination vs. 16 cases in the delayed cluster. This constituted a 





4. Discussion  
4.1 The Epidemiological aspects  
Bats are stated as the likeliest animal reservoir of the Ebola virus. In these species the virus is 
persistent, but does not cause clinical disease. On occasion pathogen spill-over into a human 
population is observed. The host response in humans is different from that in bats and causes 
EVD, a severe sometimes-fatal illness. It has the potential to cause substantial human-human 
transmission.  
 
Table 2 provides an overview of all the past outbreaks, the number of cases and deaths plus 
the Ebola species responsible. As seen, the Zaire Ebola virus has been responsible for several 
outbreaks with high case-fatality rates. The Sudan virus has also caused a number of 
epidemics, but the Case Fatality Rate (CFR) has been somewhat lower than for Zaire. The Tai 
Forest virus has only been identified in one individual who survived. The Bundibugyo virus 
was first recognized in an outbreak Uganda in 2007 with a CFR significantly lower than for 
Zaire and Sudan virus, around 30%. Reston virus has only been found in an animal reservoir 
in the Philippines. It was identified in 1989 when it caused an outbreak and deadly infection 
in macaques imported into the United States. It caused several outbreaks amongst non-human 
primates in imported animals from the Philippines to US and Europe. This strain isn’t known 
to cause severe symptoms in humans and it is shown that IgG antibodies against the virus can 
be produced (23). This demonstrates that Ebola isn’t just Ebola, there are several different 
species with varying pathogenicity and deadly potential. These differences and possible viral 
changes should be monitored for future purposes because killing its host is self-defeating 
since viruses are dependent on their hosts’ replication machinery to survive.  
 
Several of the Central African countries have had previous experience with Ebola outbreaks. 
This favours rapid containment of epidemics in several ways: even though the symptoms are 
diffuse, the health workers have a reason to suspect EVD. The illness is understood, the 
response measures and laboratory capacity is established several places (43). This way cases 
are detected at an early stage, isolated and further transmission may be prevented. Even 
though the health systems and infrastructure are weak in these countries, having experience 
with a disease and how to handle it is important, as WHO point out (43). On that account, this 
can partly explain the unique extent of the 2013-2016 West African Epidemic. The medical 
personnel did not think of the possibility that Ebola was the causative agent. In order to make 
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a diagnosis you have to think of the possibility of it. That the focus was on other highly 
prevalent diseases like malaria, cholera and Lassa fever is yet understandable. This may have 
contributed to confusion because of similar clinical symptoms in early stage. Yet, it took 3 
months before it was realised that Zaire Ebola virus was the causative agent, thus giving the 
virus time to spread throughout the populations. At this time, the outbreak was already at a 
comparable size with several of the previous epidemics (table 2). Furthermore, all necessary 
infrastructural containment measures were lacking in these areas (43). Early and correct 
identification of the causative agent will be instrumental for future epidemics. As an example, 
during the current (May 2018) outbreak of Ebola it took 4 days from the first cases were 
reported to the causative agent was identified by RT-PCR on May 7th (62). Finally, as fruit 
bats are common in large parts of West Africa (40), EVD should always be considered as a 
differential diagnosis.  
 
Although the index case of The Epidemic was traced back to a two-year-old boy in the small 
village Meliandou, some uncertainty remains on when the boy became sick. The findings in 
this report indicate that the boy became ill in the beginning of December 2013, but a follow 
up investigation dated symptom debut and death to late December. This is also in accordance 
with WHO details (43).  
 
The available literature could not establish exactly how the boy contracted Ebola. What Baize 
and colleagues conclude is that the virus has existed in West Africa for a significant amount 
of time due to the genetic differences to Zaire viruses responsible for previous epidemics (40). 
The findings further indicate that a tree infested with bats was in the boy’s 
backyard/playground. This could provide opportunity from transmission, supported by a 
report by Saéz and colleagues. However, the authors point out that other children also played 
in this tree thus providing a massive opportunity for transmission (63). Furthermore, other 
hypotheses on possible sources were explored. Exposure to infected mammals was excluded 
as a possibility since these populations were stable in size. Another theory was linked to the 
handling of bush meat. This was also considered unlikely for a number of reasons: no hunters 
were reported as family members, if infected bush meat was brought by a hunter outside the 
family, that hunter would probably also be among the first infected. Handling of infected bush 
meat would affect the adults at the same time as the 2-year-old (63). Therefore, exposure to 
bats through the infested tree is the likeliest source of infection, even though it cannot be 
100% proven.  
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Another challenge is to establish the exact consequences of forest loss in this region as the 
reason for pathogen spill-over. At this point the exact role may be difficult to identify, but 
closer and more frequent encounters between humans and bats could provide opportunity for 
human transmission and not only through the handling of bush meat. Given the bats presence 
in this region, and how common it is to handle bush meat, human EVD epidemics are rare. 
One would maybe expect epidemics to have occurred more frequently and earlier in this 
region. Consequently, challenges in explaining the timing of the spill-over event remain. For 
now, bats are identified as the likeliest reservoir, but if other sources also exist, this remains 
unknown. This uncertainty and the possible ecological factors contributing to human exposure 
highlights the need for further research. Hopefully future findings would provide important 
insight to easier predict future outbreaks. Up until such time, the whole West African region 
should be considered at risk, thus underscoring the importance of future preparedness (40).  
 
The human-human transmission from the index case to family members demonstrates some of 
the factors contributing to amplification of cases and some of their issues. First, close family 
members were the first to contract the disease. This is not that surprising as transmission often 
is difficult to limit within a household where most facilities, including bathrooms and cutlery 
are shared. Additionally, with the index case being a toddler one would expect that he 
received care from close family and thus providing severe opportunity for transmission. In 
fact it is very common in West Africa to provide care for sick family members in home 
settings. As the Norwegian psychologist Ane Bjøru Fjeldsæter wrote in her book “De 
Uberørbare” (Eng.:“The Untouchables”) about her field experience in West Africa: 
“caregiving is Ebola’s secret weapon.”(64).  
 
Furthermore, introduction of the disease to health care settings generated more cases. 
Amplification of cases from the index case also occurred through funerals and the 2013-2016 
epidemic led to a substantial increase in numbers. Illustrated by the fact that 360 cases were 
traced back to the funeral of a traditional healer. Another example of this is demonstrated by 
findings documented in a mortality and morbidity weekly report (MMWR) from the 
Moyamba district in Sierra Leone. A burial of a pharmacist generated 28 new confirmed 
cases, and that in a district that had a low incidence of EVD. 21 of the subsequent cases had 
reported touching the man’s body at the funeral, 16 had direct contact with him prior to his 
death (65).  
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In previous epidemics geography aided containment. Most of them occurred in rural areas far 
away from populated cities. Limited distribution favours rapid containment in such settings, 
as control measures are easier to implement and only a few coordinating facilities are needed. 
In West Africa the geographic characteristics facilitated the magnitude of The Epidemic. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the epicentre for the outbreak is in proximity of both Liberia’s and 
Sierra Leone’s border. It wasn’t just the geographic proximity in itself hat caused the 
magnitude. It has to be seen in the light of the highly mobile populations, as the findings 
reveal. When extremely convenient cross border traffic is added to the equation, rapid 
dissemination of the disease can be explained. Some explanations for the high population 
mobility in these countries are described in the literature: Poverty is an important driver as it 
forces people to travel in order to find work and food. In addition, in West Africa it is 
common to have relatives in other countries and mobility is therefore enhanced (43).  
 
The geographic and demographic characteristics complicated control measurements. For 
instance, contact tracers did not cross the national borders (43), with the consequences being 
suboptimal contact tracing and that unidentified patients spread the disease. Section 4.3 
highlights the importance of a robust response system. When one country experiences 
declines in case count, new clusters were introduced from neighbouring countries seeking 
more available treatment facilities (43). This highlights the importance of cooperation 
between all countries and also one coordinating organ for all countries. Under those 
circumstances no country was safe until eradication was a fact in the whole region.  
 
Convenient connections did not only exist between the three countries. Movements from the 
rural areas to more populated areas, including all three capitals facilitated the spread and 
made the magnitude possible. In many of the West African cities large parts of the 
populations are poor and live densely in townships. This is often exacerbated by inadequate 
hygiene conditions, thus providing severe opportunity for transmission. Furthermore, 
implementation of control measures can be demanding in such settings. Just imagine the 
challenges with conducting contact tracing in multi-million cities. Despite of this, control can 
be achieved as seen in Nigeria with the introduction of Ebola to Lagos. This had the potential 
to become a catastrophe, but the outbreak was limited. First, the country was prepared for 
cases, as they had been witness to widespread transmission in their neighbouring countries for 
months. Furthermore, in the years prior to the outbreak a Polio Operations Centre served as a 
coordinating unit to battle Polio. This structure was successfully adapted in the EVD response 
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ensuring a unified coordinating unit (43). Close collaboration with the governmental Ebola 
Emergency Operations Centre (EEOC) and global organisations like Centers for disease 
control and prevention (CDC), World Health Orgainzation  (WHO) and Médicins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) was instrumental (66). The conduction of contact tracing in Nigeria is also a 
story of success. GPS systems were implemented and contacts were instructed to stay at home 
and at least avoid crowded areas, for 5 contacts group quarantine was utilized due to high-risk 
exposure (67). All contacts were followed up daily (43). At the end of the Nigerian outbreak 
almost all contacts were accounted for and sufficiently followed up (43, 68). According to 
Ørjan Olsvik Nigeria and Mali are the only countries were a thorough epidemiological 
investigation and contact tracing were conducted (69).  
 
Another aspect of the introduction of Ebola virus (EBOV) to capital cities with international 
airports was the transcontinental spread with the following fear for a pandemic. Gomes and 
colleagues conducted a study on the assessment of the international spread risk in 2014 and 
the findings state that the risk was small, but not insignificant. The authors stressed that the 
risk would increase if control measures weren’t improved, and especially if the Nigerian 
outbreak escalated (70). However, to state that international spread was limited due to the 
Nigerian containment would be wild speculation. Therefore, all countries should have the 
facilities to isolate and treat EVD patients and have protocols on containment of spread even 
though the risk is small.   
 
The temporal characteristics of this epidemic permitted for increased genomic variation of the 
EBOV according to Professor Martin Hibberd at London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine (71). A study conducted by Gire and colleagues revealed a very high viral mutation 
rate during the 2013-2016 West African Ebola Epidemic with frequent non-synonymous 
mutation (which alter the amino acid sequences and are therefore subject to natural selection). 
Hebberd discuss that the increased genomic variation can have different effects on the clinical 
picture of EVD in humans. One possibility is increased viral load that leads to increased 
transmission to others and/or a more severe course of disease. Another possibility is that 
alteration of the genome sequences lead to a lower viral load, but the time of infectiousness is 
longer, thus permitting transmission to more people (71). A second study conducted by 
Dietzel and colleagues on the functional significance of three non-synonymous mutations was 
investigated. They studied the significance of three different mutations: 1. In the gene for L 
polymerase, one receptor part of the GP and finally a part of the NP. The results indicate that 
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the mutations impact on the different viral proteins. A recombinant EBOV with all the three 
mutations showed growth advantage compared to a prototype lacking the named mutations in 
cell cultures (72). However, the studies could not determine what exact role this played for 
transmissibility and pathogenicity the West African Epidemic, although they stressed that 
progression of The Epidemic could lead to viral adaption (72, 73).  Furthermore Hibberd 
points out that the selection process takes a long time and in order for the mutated gene 
sequences to survive they have to be transmitted back to the natural reservoir so they can be 
conserved(71). That means that as long as containment measures are put in place the 
mutations will “burn out.” This underscores the importance of control measurements.  
 
4.2 Infected health workers- a challenge in response to the epidemic  
In response to an epidemic like the Ebola in West Africa, health workers are fundamental. 
Therefore, when such a substantial number of the health workforce infections and deaths 
occur, the response to the epidemic is weakened. This further deteriorated an already fragile 
health workforce (38). Health worker infections did not only threaten the ability to manage 
the current outbreak, but also impaired the health systems’ abilities to provide future health 
services. When foreign health workers engaged by international organisations also became 
infected it contributed to weaken the response. An additional challenge is that health worker 
infections may contribute to increased community mistrust and therefore preventing EVD 
patients from seeking health services. As Forrester and colleagues explain in their Morbidity 
and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) this creates new opportunities for transmission of 
Ebola and further impair the capacity of the health system (53). Another aspect is that infected 
health workers unknowingly can transmit the disease to other patients, creating an extreme 
dangerous situation.  
 
Health worker case counts declined from the autumn 2014 (Figure 3). A few events can 
explain this. Infection Prevention and Control strategies (IPC) strategies were lacking in the 
early phase of the response and weren’t augmented until the second half of 2014 (49, 51, 52). 
Therefore, it's plausible that these measures contributed to declining case counts and has also 
been posed as a factor in the literature (38, 50, 52). Matanock describes in an article that 
overpowering infections in the staff lead to closure of health facilities. Closure of health 
facilities is discussed as a contributing factor to the decline of cases (50). Consequently, 
health services became more unavailable with fewer patients seeking help and health workers 
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were less exposed to transmission. Figure 3 also demonstrates a small increase of cases after 
January 2015. WHO discuss that a possible explanation is that as case counts in the general 
community apparently decreased, adherence to Personal Protective equipment (PPE) and 
general hygiene decreased (43).  
 
As previously discussed, transmission of Ebola is associated with general care. This is also 
illustrated in the health sector were nurses as an occupational group accounted for > 50% of 
the infected health workers. Nurses are generally in more direct contact with their patients and 
consequently at higher risk for contamination.  
 
Based on gender, a male predominance in health worker infections was noted. Furthermore, 
95% of the medical workers were men, but amongst the nurses (the workforce group most 
affected) the men constituted 45%. In Guinea for instance, the males represented 46.4% of the 
total health workforce. As an occupational group, doctors constituted a larger proportion than 
in the two other countries. However, as Grinnell points out, this doesn’t explain the whole 
picture because even in most of the health workforce groups, infections in the male workers 
were more common than in female workers (20). This is also supported by WHO findings that 
men disproportionally affected. The exact reasons therefore remain uncertain, and WHO 
highlighted the need for investigations (38).  
 
The high infection risk that is associated with being a health worker can be explained by the 
fact that Ebola cases were more concentrated in health care setting than in the general 
community, and when precaution measures were suboptimal health workers were at 
significant infection risk. Hence, favourable conditions for nosocomial transmission are 
created and to later extent amplification of case counts.  
 
Infections occurred more commonly in non-Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs) than in facilities 
dedicated to Ebola treatment. Several risk factors and determinants on different levels existed 
in the workplace. To review all of the identified factors is not the intention of this paper, but 
some factors should be addressed.  
 
A possible explanation for the big difference in health worker infections between ETU- and 
non-ETU settings is that in the ETU settings administrative infrastructure (leadership, 
procedures regarding triage, PPE, waste management etc.) was implemented to a greater 
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extent than in general care facilities. Health workers also received extensive training before 
beginning their work in the ETUs (56). That infrastructural challenges was a common 
problem outside ETU settings is understandable as one cannot expect that health systems 
without previous experience with Ebola management to succeed on their own. Consequently, 
the Ministries of Health (MOHs) in the respective countries were assisted by WHO to 
implement sufficient systems (38). However, the responses were significantly delayed (74) 
and that contributed to the widespread health worker transmissions.  
 
Ideally all patients should have been triaged, isolated and treated at dedicated Ebola facilities. 
Forrester and colleagues provide an example. In Monrovia, Liberia there was a dedicated 
ETU facility that was in close proximity to a community hospital where the emergency 
department served as the triage point for the ETU (53). Additionally, patients often sought 
care in traditional health facilities, either for EVD symptoms or other diseases. Patients were 
sometimes not recognized to have EVD (49, 53). Inconsistent triage systems are maybe one of 
the most severe shortcomings when it comes to protect health workers from the Ebola virus 
because the consequence is that health workers provide unprotected care to highly infectious 
patients.  
 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) provides a physical barrier between the health worker   
and the infected patient, thus ensuring interruption of transmission chains. In the 2013-2016 
West African Epidemic concerns regarding PPE were detected on many levels in the health 
care setting. Resource shortages are problematic for several reasons. Obviously, PPE cannot 
be used when it’s lacking. Secondly shortages may lead to the reuse of already utilised 
equipment, as indicated in table 3. Nevertheless, the availability of PPE is in my opinion not 
sufficient to prevent health worker infections. Structured training on how to don, doff and 
general behaviour while wearing PPE is essential. For future purposes, the training should 
contain both theoretical and practical sessions for optimal learning. These goals are ambitious, 
especially in countries with pre-existing infrastructural challenges. However, such Ebola 
outbreaks as seen in West Africa are a danger to public health, meaning that they are of 
international concern, demonstrated by the declaration of The Epidemic being “a public 
health emergency of international concern” by WHO on August 8th 2014 (45).  
 
One must also keep in mind the challenging conditions under which health workers worked: 
Just wearing PPE for a durable time in high humidity and temperature can be exhausting. 
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When adding long working hours, staff shortages and emotional distress it's understandable 
that mistakes could be made, even by adequately trained staff. Therefore, it is recommended 
that health workers work in pairs in ETUs. If problems occur, the “buddy” will back up their 
partner. The buddy also serve as an additional overseer in case the partner misses an 
important step (56). That this was difficult to accomplish, is understandable. As table 3 
reports, staff shortages were a problem during this Epidemic. This can explain why it wasn’t 
always possible to work in pairs. Another aspect of this problem is that others become 
overloaded with work leading to exhaustion. Under such circumstances mistakes are easer 
made, thus providing opportunities for infection.   
 
As Olu and colleagues discuss, the findings should provide confidence to those working in 
ETU facilities that protection measures put in place are effective when protocol is followed. 
Additionally, this may have contributed to demystify prejudices and resistance about the 
ETUs in the communities and that health worker infections in these facilities were uncommon 
(51). As an example, of the 3400 MSF employed staff, 27 acquired EVD. This number is very 
low compared to other institutions, indicating that MSF personnel were professional, well 
trained and that security is of top priority. The investigations on the MSF personnel that 
acquired Ebola revealed that most transmissions had occurred in the community, outside the 
work settings (43). This further proves that prevention measures in these treatment facilities 
are effective when adhered to. 
 
 As some of the findings indicate and further illustrated by the MSF workers community 
acquired EVD infections, it's highly expected that other health workers also contracted Ebola 
outside the place of work. First of all, like everyone else health workers are a part of their 
respective general communities. They have families and friends. They engage in local events, 
like funerals. Interestingly, the one report from Sierra Leone indicated that health workers 
were less likely to have attended funerals (50), and could partly be explained by greater 
awareness in health workers. Physical contact is many places part of everyday life. Finally, 
health workers often have a strong desire to provide care for ill relatives and colleagues. 
When preformed without adequate protection, a part of the health worker infections can be 




4.3 Containment measures – important, but challenging  
Ebola is transmitted by human-human transmission through direct contact with infested 
bodily fluids. Consequently, all prevention measures that are implemented in response to an 
outbreak are aimed at breaking these transmission chains. The importance of early detection 
of cases cannot be emphasized enough. If adequately conducted, early detection is followed 
by prompt isolation, which reduces transmission within the community. Contact tracing 
should always be conducted after case identification.  
4.3.1 The Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU) is designed to prevent transmission  
The layout of the ETU in itself is aimed at preventing human-human transmission (56) and is 
therefore a relevant part in IPC strategies. Figure 5 provides a graphic structure of an 
Médicins Sans Frotières (MSF) ETU and differs slightly from the explanation given in the 
text that is based on CDC standards. The greatest difference is that the MSF ETU contains 
three zones within the high-risk area. This difference isn’t of great importance as both serve 
their function as isolation units.  
 
At the triage area it is important to identify those with EVD in order to rapidly isolate them 
from the community, but it is also relevant to distinguish these patients from non-EVD cases. 
Patients without Ebola should not be hold up in these settings, as this may increase the 
likelihood for contamination. 
 
Furthermore, the zones of the hospital are a contribution to limit transmission. Patients with 
suspected and confirmed Ebola are separated in the high-risk area. In the suspected area 
patients are tested for EVD and some will be negative, illustrating the importance of dividing 
the high-risk area in order to prevent transmission. Symptomatic EVD patients are highly 
contagious. The benefit of the ETU is that these highly infectious patients are located with 
other contagious people, thus preventing both community transmission and transmission to 
other patients as they cannot infect each other. Another important aim of establishing ETUs 
was to provide good supportive care (56). In previous epidemics with a limited number of 
cases, isolation and further transmission was of main priority. Due to the extent of the 2013-
2016 West African Epidemic the need for treatment was addressed. By providing with fluid 
and electrolyte substitution, mortality was reduced from 80% to 50% (69). This is a 
monumental decline in deaths, illustrating the importance of this strategy in the future.  
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This may also encourage patients to seek these facilities. The ETUs also ensure better control 
over the deceased EVD patients, and important aspect, as they are highly infectious.  
 
The unidirectional flow of both patients and employees adds another dimension to 
preventative measures. Movement from low-risk to high-risk area ensure that EVD positive 
patients don’t infect non-EVD patients. Additionally as all surfaces in the high risk area 
should be considered as contaminated (56) a unidirectional flow of health workers prevent 
transmission from contaminated PPE  to non-Ebola patients.  
 
Although the physical layout of these facilities provides protection for both patients and 
health workers, it's only one aspect regarding the containment measures within the ETU. The 
importance of PPE has already been addressed. Furthermore, strict hygiene protocols are 
fundamental to prevent transmission, also between patients. This might be particularly 
important in the suspected area, where health workers potentially can transmit EVD from 
infected patients to non-EVD patients if hand hygiene is unsatisfactory. Other important 
aspects are how to obtain blood samples, how to manage waste and corpses (56). Strict 
adherence to protocol limits infection within the facilities.  
 
4.3.2 Safe burials – where security and culture collides  
An insight to the risk of transmission is provided for in the findings, where amplification of 
cases through burial ceremonies is provided for. This also illustrates the risk for 
contamination that is associated with deceased patients. Some of the most common practices 
include touching and washing of the dead body providing an enormous opportunity for 
transmission. The WHO guidelines are scientifically developed and based on previous field 
experiences (58) to prevent direct transmission. That these guidelines were met with 
resistance is understandable because they interfere with local customs at a very vulnerable 
time. Resultantly, in order for safe funerals to be conducted, response teams rely on 
community engagement. Therefore the necessity to obtain permission to conduct the funeral, 
respecting religious views/traditions and to inclusion of family members and religious leaders 
in the ceremony cannot be undermined. This ensures dignity for the deceased and the 
mourners and may contribute to reduce tension (58). Manguvo and Mafuvadze highlight the 
importance of targeting information campaigns towards community leaders as the people 
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often accept instructions given by someone that they trust (75). This should be a key strategy 
in future epidemics and must not be delayed. 
 
4.3.3 Contact tracing 
As presented in the material and methods the reproduction rate, R0 provides an estimate of the 
number of secondary cases per infected patient in a susceptible population. Even though this 
number is significantly lower (45) compared to measles for instance (76) they demonstrate 
that transmissions will continue to occur even if one contact is missed. As illustrated by figure 
5 the premise for contact tracing is case identification. The case definition is previously 
discussed. The process of interviewing the cases will hopefully reveal all potential contacts. 
Interviewing relatives or other people close to the case and/or contact may provide additional 
information and can be of great value. This is especially important if the patient is dead at 
time of identification. Subsequent questioning of the contact regarding symptoms and signs of 
EVD provide the opportunity to uncover a new case. Therefore, the 21 days of daily 
observation is meaningful as this is the incubation period for the virus. A detailed observation 
form is provided for in the guidelines, regarding EVD symptoms. If symptoms develop, the 
potential case (former contact) can be managed accordingly.  
 
This response is highly dependent on the contact acceptance to be observed and as WHO 
guidelines point out that might be dependent on many different factors (55): first of all 
knowledge about the disease essential. Why should someone contribute to being monitored 
for a disease they know nothing about and sometimes even doubt that it exists. Second the 
stigma associated with the disease may restrict the effectiveness, also because listing of the 
contacts of contact may be a source of conflict in the communities. As for the burial 
ceremonies a key to community acceptance is to cooperate with the community and religious 
leaders, and highlight that the intention of this process is not only to limit community 
transmission, but also to provide decent medical care. As already addressed, the vast 
geographic distribution and population characteristics challenged contact tracing, a problem 
that WHO also pointed out. Finally, because of the different response partners in this outbreak 
different standards for contact tracing were implemented in different areas. One standard 




4.3.4 Vaccination, where do we stand?  
Vaccination has traditionally been a very important tool to prevent transmission. As this also 
provides with immunity of a given disease, it affects the R0 and secondary cases may 
therefore be reduced. The ring vaccination trial conducted by Henao-Restrepo et al. in Guinea 
and Sierra Leone is a new and interesting study design that reflects the way Ebola is 
transmitted. Contacts and contacts of contacts were identified and eligible candidates were 
included in the study (61). This is a clever strategy given that people closest to a symptomatic 
EVD patient is at greatest risk for acquiring the disease. Randomisation is preferable when 
conducting medical studies, but during the study period some ethical challenges were 
identified, due to promising preliminary results. Consequently, the randomisation stopped and 
children were also included in the study. When no cases of EVD were detected after 10 days 
in the immediate vaccination group, the vaccine efficacy was calculated to 100%. However, 
the number of patients in the control group was low, and could affect the efficacy results.  
 
According to the Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization (SAGE) 12 different 
vaccine candidates for Ebola are in a trial phase (77). However, according to them and 
Henao-Restrepo et al. the “Ebola, ça suffit!” trial is the only one demonstrating a clinical 
effect of an experimental Ebola vaccine (61, 77). Although not being a part of the study some 
evidence of indirect immunity was provided for. The authors argue that the still experimental 
vaccine contributed to containment of the 2013-2016 Epidemic (61). Consequently, it is 
SAGE’s recommendation that the experimental vaccine is to be used in future Zaire Ebola 
epidemics with ring vaccination as standard (77).  The latest outbreak of Zaire Ebola virus 
was declared in DRC on May 8th 2018 and WHO is in collaboration with the MOH and MSF 
implementing the experimental vaccine as an IPC strategy (62). Even though the vaccine is 
still experimental it has the potential to prevent community transmission, provide protection 
to health workers and maybe even discourage use of the virus in biological warfare. It should 
be underscored that even though the vaccine shows promising results it must not be a 
replacement of other, validated IPC measures, but serve as a supplementation.  
 
What the study by Henao-Restrepo and colleagues fail to provide is an estimate 
immunogenicity of the vaccine due to a decision of not to collect biological material. This is 
attributable to difficulties with the implementation of the trial (61).  
 However, a double-blinded, placebo-controlled dose-response study by Heppner and 
colleagues published in the Lancet (78), provide evidence that binding an neutralizing 
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antibodies still was maintained after 1 year. Even though these are promising results, it is 
important to distinguish between antibody detection and protection against the disease. In 
other words: biochemical immunity and protective immunity is not the same. What 
implication viral mutation rates had or will have on vaccine efficacy/development in the 
future remains uncertain, but should not be neglected. Another limiting factor is that the 
recommendations only are applied for Zaire Ebola virus. As other species of Ebola 
traditionally has caused epidemics (table 2) this should also be expected in the future. This 
highlights the need for further research. An aspect that must not be disregarded is that in order 
to conduct the vaccination, the vaccine must be transported to the current area. The difficulty 
in transporting it is demonstrated by the current 2018 outbreak in DRC where the epicentre is 
a remote area 15 hours by motorbike from the closest town. This is further augmented, as the 
vaccine has to be stored at minimum -60ºC (79). This highlights that even though an 
experimental vaccine is proven effective, the availability to the people can be restrictive.  
 
4.4 Thesis strengths and limitations 
Due to the recentness of The West African Ebola Epidemic from 2013-2016 a challenge to 
the research was that comprehensive analyses of The Epidemic have not yet been completed, 
as the trauma of The Epidemic is still raw in memory. As such, in the early phase of my 
research, I realised I needed to develop my own parameters instead of following those in the 
existing literature. Furthermore, due to the complexity of The Epidemic it was not possible to 
review all events and problems that occurred during that time. Consequently, this thesis only 
covers three main aspects of The Epidemic, and not the full picture. The thesis covers a 
snapshot of some of the events. As new knowledge continually becomes available, the picture 
might look different in the future.  
 
As a consequence of The Epidemic’s many challenges it was found appropriate to review 
several aspects. In retrospect, three main topics might be considered as too extensive for this 
thesis. Since there were several problems that were to be reviewed, it was found appropriate 
to preform separate searches for each problem that was to be highlighted. An ideal approach 
when constructing literature studies is to construct a wide-range search matrix for systematic 
searches. The chosen method was not ideal, but seemed most suitable within the bounds of 
this project. This could mean that potential relevant articles were not identified. However, it 




For certain parts of the paper, PubMed was the main search engine. This could be a limitation 
in itself as this excludes potentially relevant articles in other databases. Some of the search 
results included review articles that were found to be relevant for this thesis. Although such 
articles are not original research, they provide a valuable insight to certain topics. Such 
articles are often written by people considered experts in their fields and they must be read 
critically as they can include the author’s personal opinion. A way to ensure that they are of 
decent quality is to review the sources these articles are based on. The findings in these 
articles are also supported by findings elsewhere in the literature. Additionally, some sources 
were also retrieved after screening reference lists. This may be a result of an unsystematic 
search or too narrow search terms. In addition, some sources are based on personal 
communication. Even though some of these findings might be challenging to reproduce, it is 
my conclusion that they are representative.  
 
Some parts of this thesis are based on a limited amount of sources, primarily WHO 
documents and CDC training documents. Although it would be ideal to provide a wider range 
of sources to ensure validity of the findings, documents and guidelines published by CDC and 
WHO should be considered of high enough quality.  
A central question regarding the epidemiological data is its accuracy. As this Epidemic was 
an international emergency other measures than epidemiological research were prioritised. It 
should be noted that the VHF database on case numbers were to a certain extent incomplete 
with underreporting of numbers and clinical data. With regard to infected health workers, 
different definitions of what constituted a health worker were used, and in some cases not all 
categories were considered as such. This may also have affected the data.  
 
Furthermore, the included articles that identified possible exposures and risk factors for 
infection were of retrospective nature. Retrospective identification of possible exposures and 
risk factors can create opportunities for “recall bias”, and especially under the challenging 
circumstances of The Epidemic and the stigma of being infected. However, many of the same 





The findings in this thesis have not been able to provide new knowledge on the 2013-2016 
West African Ebola Epidemic, but has attempted to provide a review of some distinguishing 
epidemiological features, features of infected health workers and contributing factors and key 
elements to stopping such an epidemic. 
 
5.1 Ebola: Old virus in a new setting  
Up until the 2013-2016 West African Ebola Epidemic 23 identified outbreaks have been 
identified in Central Africa. Several different strains have been identified, with varying Case 
Fatality Rates. Bats have been identified as the likeliest animal reservoir for Ebola where the 
infection persists, but does not cause clinical disease. Occasionally, a pathogen spill-over into 
a human population takes place. The West African Ebola Epidemic was the first of its nature 
to occur in this part of Africa. Zaire Ebola Virus was identified as a causative agent. It is 
likely that the virus has circulated in this region prior to the outbreak. Fruit bats are common 
in this region and it has experienced significant forest loss. The exact role for this in pathogen 
spill-over into the human population is undetermined, but may have lead to closer and more 
frequent encounters between bats and humans. The geographic origin in itself may have 
contributed to the spread due to several reasons. This was a viral disease new to the areas. It 
wasn’t considered a likely diagnosis and was masked by other endemic diseases. Correct 
identification of the virus was severely delayed, thus facilitating undetected spread throughout 
the populations. The health system had no experience with managing cases. The epicentre in 
Guinea was located in close proximity to the borders of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 
populations in these three countries are highly mobile and convenient access existed both 
across the borders and between rural areas and large cities. This facilitated dissemination of 
the disease. The introduction of the virus to cities with multi-million inhabitants enabled for 
the first time ever, transcontinental spread. The first transmission chains through family 
members reveal that Ebola is a virus that through caregiving. Some case amplification was 





5.2 Impact on the health workforce  
During the West African Epidemic a substantial number of health workers were infected and 
died and compared to the overall population they were significantly at higher risk. As for the 
general population the findings indicate that transmission is associated with general care 
giving. Most infections occurred outside dedicated Ebola Treatment Units (ETUs). This 
indicates that the training, prevention measures and overall protocols in ETU settings work to 
prevent health worker infections. In hospital settings, other than ETUs several risk factors and 
shortages in prevention measures have been identified. This provided massive opportunities 
for infections in the workplace. Also, health worker infections occurred in the communities. 
As there were many possible exposure opportunities, to establish the exact settings for 
transmission is difficult. Health workers are essential when building a response system to 
stopping an outbreak. High numbers of infected health workers can lead to amplification of 
cases, undermine the overall response to such epidemics and impair future health services. 
For future purposes sufficient training, guidance and protective equipment in addition to 
clearly defined triage systems for identification of cases will be essential to prevent health 
workers from acquiring EVD.  
 
5.3 Containment measures  
In order to contain an outbreak early identification of cases is essential. All successive 
measures aim to prevent direct human-human transmission. Establishment of dedicated Ebola 
Treatment Units that were designed with separate areas for triage, suspected and confirmed 
cases and with a unidirectional flow for patients and health workers. This design prevented 
transmission both between patients and to health workers. Strict adherence to guidelines for 
Personal Protective Equipment and hygiene protocols are fundamental for the ETU to serve as 
intended. The ETUs did not only as isolation units, but were also a facility were good 
supportive care could be received.  
 
Contact tracing is a key in containing an Ebola outbreak. All contacts of a case should be 
identified through thoroughly conducted interviews. Even if one contact is missed new chains 
of transmission will continue to occur. The contact is followed up for 21 days and asked daily 
about possible EVD symptoms. If symptoms develop, the person can be managed 
immediately. During the West African Ebola Epidemic this response was challenged as a 
consequence of the substantial number of infected, vast geographic spread: both to multi-
!
! 48!
million cities and across national borders. As contact follow-up is highly dependent on the 
persons willingness to being monitored this may have added another dimension to challenges 
in this response. As a consequence of the massive amplification of cases through traditional 
burial ceremonies, the West African Ebola Epidemic illustrates the importance of conducting 
safe burials. The WHO guidelines provide with a detailed step on how this ideally should be 
conducted, but this response was challenged due to the interference with local cultural 
customs.  
 
Vaccination has traditionally been an important tool to prevent transmission as it can provide 
immunity. During the 2013-2016 West African Epidemic a clinical trial on the efficacy of the 
experimental rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine showed promising results. More research on this vaccine 
in needed before licencing. Despite this, the vaccine has the potential to serve as a 
containment measure in future epidemics.  
 
5.4 The future perspective  
The emergence of Ebola in Guinea illustrates that the whole West African region should be 
prepared for future outbreaks. Bats are common in this region and as long as the animal 
reservoir exists future outbreaks are inevitable. To eradicate bats as a strategy to prevent 
future outbreaks is an impossible mission. Therefore, strategies to limit outbreaks are an 
expedient approach. The 2013-2016 West African Epidemic highlights the importance of 
having knowledge and experience with such outbreaks. A lesson from this Epidemic is to 
always consider EVD as a differential diagnosis when patients present with mysterious 
symptoms, thus ensuring rapid identification of correct agent. The fear of Ebola might be a 
greater danger than the virus itself. Lack of knowledge is an important fear driver. An 
important focus area in preparedness for future outbreaks in exposed areas should entail 
general EVD education. All community members should be informed, but community and 
religious leader should especially be enlightened, as they are respected and trusted in the 
communities and can reach out to their members.  
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9. Appendix   
9.1 Summary of literature evaluations (GRADE)  
 
  
Reference:    
WHO. Health worker Ebola infections in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone 2015 [16]. 
Available from: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/ebola/health-worker-
infections/en/. WHO reference number WHO/EVD/SDS/REPORT/2015.1 
Design: Case series 
Level of scientific evidence:  III 
Grade:  2 
Aim Materials and method Results Discussion 
To describe and characterize health 
worker infection outcomes, and to 






(comprised of the 
national VHF databases 
from Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone). 
 
Population:  
Registered cases of 
EVD in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra 
Leone from January 1st  
2014 to March 31st  
2015.  
Excluded: 
- Suspected cases (only 
included confirmed and 
probable cases) 





- Country: Guinea, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone 
- Sex: Female/male. 
- Age-group: 15-29 










accounted for 3,9 % 
(815/20 955) of all 
confirmed and 
probable cases of 
EVD reported in the 
study period. It 
decreased from 12 % 
in July 2014 to 1 % 
in February 2015. 
 
Depending on the 
health profession, the 
risk was between 21 





61 % of health 
workers infections 
were in males. 
 
Nearly 50 % of all 
EVD infections in 
health workers 
occurred in those 
ages between 30 and 





• Was the study based on a random sample from a suitable patient 
group? Yes.  
• Was it ensured that the sample was unselected?? No, great 
uncertainty about the registration in the database.   
• Were the inclusion criteria clearly defined? Yes.  
• Was the response rate high enough? Not relevant.  
• Were all the patients in the sample in same stage of disease? All 
cases with same disease. 
• Was the follow-up of patients sufficient (type/dimension/time) to 
display the end-points? Not relevant. 
• Were the criteria to validate the end-points objective? Validation 
uncertain.  
• When comparing case-series, were the series adequately 
described and the allocation of the prognostic factors described? 
Unclear. 
• Was the data registration prospective? No. 
 
  Strength 
- Included cases in three countries with widespread and intense 
transmission, and a relatively large number of cases (when the 
diagnosis is taken into account) when suspected cases excluded 
 
  Weakness 
- Minimal information about how the registration in the database is 
done. For health workers: Reported by the case themselves, and we 
don´t know if the infection was acquired with or without linkage to care 
provision. 
- Limited clinical data (under-reporting, duplications, missing and 
incomplete data, all health workers might not have been recorded as 
health workers) 
- Some uncertain diagnoses since probable cases included, and a 
significant number of health worker infections with unknown status 
among the suspected cases. 






Depending on the helath profession, 
the risk was between 21 to 32 times 
higher in health workers compared to 
non-health workers ≥ 15 years of age. 
While the risk of infection among 
those selected health workers is very 
high, is is however, much lower than 
the risk previously reported. 
Countries 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
 






Reference:  Senga M, Pringle K, Ramsay A, Brett-Major DM, Fowler RA, French I, et al. Factors Underlying Ebola Virus 
Infection Among Health Workers, Kenema, Sierra Leone, 2014–2015. Clinical Infectious Diseases: An Official Publication of the 
Infectious Diseases Society of America. 2016;63(4):454-9. 
 
Design: Case series  
Level of scientific 
evidence 
 III 
Grade:   2 
Aim  Material and methods  Results  Discussion 
To examine facort associated with Ebola virus exposure 
and mortality in HWs in Kenema District, Sierra Leone  
Data source 
Viral hemorrhagic fever database 
(maintained by Sierra Leone Ministry of 
Health and Sanitation). For HWs 
database was supplemented with contact 
tracing records to obtain additional 
information about contacts. Hospital 
records, burial logs and public obituaries 
were also included.  
Population  
Registered cases of suspected, probable 
and confirmed EVD cases in HWs in 
Kenema District.  
Data for non-HWs were included for 
comparison  
HW-definition: anyone who worked in a 
healthcare facility or engaged in healing 
practices (eg. traditional healers) and 
clinical staff as persons who have 
traditional patient-care roles and 
routinely have direct contact with 
patients (eg. doctors, nurses, and 
laboratory technicians  
Exclusion criteria: persons <18 years 
and cases that did not meet WHO 
definition for EVD  
 
Exposure  
• HWs/non-HWs  
• Sex: male/female  
• Age <45/≥45 years  
• Reported contact with case of EVD 
(incl. Type of contact)  
• Time to symptom presentation: 
≤7/>7days 
 
Statistical analysis:  
For categorical data: χ2 .  
For continuous variables: t-test  
To estimate ORs for associations 
between potential risk factors for EVD 
and deaths univariate and multivariable 
logistic regression models were used 
with 95% CI.  
Variables that were significant in 
univariate analysis were evaluated in 
multiple logistic regression models, 
while retaining biologically relevant 
variables. P values of <.05 were 




In study period 600 cases of 
EVD originated in Kenema 
district, including 92 (15%) 
HWs, 66 (72%) of whom 
worked at KGH, 18% 
worked at other non-ETU 
facilities  
18 of 62 (29%) worked in 
the ETU developed EVD, 
compared with 48 of 83 
(58%) who worked 
elsewhere in the hospital.  
13% of HWs with EVD 
reported contact with EVD 
patients, 27% reported 
contact with other infected 
HWs.  
HWs were significantly 
more likely to identify prior 
contact with someone with 
EVD (42% vs 24%, 
respectively; OR, 2.9 [95% 
CI, 1.7–5.0]).  
The number of HW EVD 
cases at KGH declined 
roughly 1 month after 
implementation of a new 
triage system at KGH and 
the opening of a second 
ETU within the district.  
The case fatality ratio for 
HWs and non-HWs with 
EVD was 69% and 74%, 
respectively.  
 
 Check list: 
• Was the study based on a 
random sample from a suitable 
patient group? Yes.  
• Was it ensured that the sample 
was unselected? No, great 
uncertainty about the 
registration in VHF database, 
burial logs and public obituaries 
and how these were accessed.   
• Were the inclusion criteria 
clearly defined? Yes.  
• Was the response rate high 
enough? Not relevant.  
• Were all the patients in the 
sample in same stage of 
disease? All cases with same 
disease. 
• Was the follow-up of patients 
sufficient (type/dimension/time) 
to display the end-points? Not 
relevant. 
• Were the criteria to validate the 
end-points objective? Validation 
uncertain.  
• When comparing case-series, 
were the series adequately 
described and the allocation of 
the prognostic factors 
described? Uncertain.  
• Was the data registration 
prospective? No. 
 
  Strengths  
• Describes one of the largest 
clusters of HW infections ever 
reported  
• Access to multiple data sources  
 
Limitations  
• Retrospective collection on 
possible HW exposures – not all 
cases were interviewed  
• Undetermined whether HW 
contact with EVD patients was 
protected or unprotected and if 
breaches in protocol occurred- 
cannot make conclusion 
regarding PPE /IPC measures  
• Broad case definition of HW 
• Limited clinical data available 
• Data on HW infection may have 
been more thoroughly recorded 
than for non-HWs – 









The cluster of HW EVD cases in Kenma District is one 
of the largest ever reported. Most HWs with EVD had 
potential virus exposure both inside and outside of 
hospitals. Prevention measures for HW´S must address a 
spectrum of infection risks both formal and informal 
care settings as well as in the community. 
 
Country  
Sierra Leone  





Reference:    Heppner DG, Jr., Kemp TL, Martin BK, Ramsey WJ, Nichols R, Dasen EJ, et al. Safety and immunogenicity of the 
rVSVG-ZEBOV-GP Ebola virus vaccine candidate in healthy adults: a phase 1b randomised, multicentre, double-blind, placebo-





 Ib  
Grade:   3  
Aim Materials and Methods  Results  Discussion 
To Assess the safety and 
immunogenicity of rVSVΔG-
ZEBOV-GP 
Study design: Phase 1b double blind, 
placebo-controlled, dose-response study 
 
Inclusion/exclusion criteria  
Participants: healthy adult men, non-
pregnant, non-lactating women 18-60 
years old 
Any medical condition that might 
increase risk of participation of the 
participants or their contacts, or 
confound interpretation of vaccine safety 
and immunogenicity. Full list of 
inclusion and exclusion criteria available 
in appendix.  
 
Randomisation:  
N= 513, in two separate cohorts.  
Cohort 1: N= 256 assigned to receive 
3x103, 3x104, 3x105 or 3x106 PFU doses 
of the vaccine (N=64 each group) N=74 
received placebo.  
Cohort 2: N= 162 received 3x106 
(N=20) 9x106 (N=47), 2x107 (N=47) or 
1x108 (N=48) PFU doses of vaccine, 
N=20 received placebo. Participants 
were centrally allocated to vaccine 
groups or placebo through computer-
generated randomisation list. All study 
personnel remained blinded throughout 
the study.  
 
Outcome  
Primary safety outcome: incidence of 
adverse events within 14 days in all 
randomly assigned participants  
Primary immunogenicity outcome: Zaire 
Ebola virus-specific antibody rensponses 
at day 28 by dose group.  
Statistical analysis:  
Safety analysis was based on modified 
intention to treat population (vaccinated 
and placebo)  
Immunogenicity was analysed in per-
protocol population (on day 0 and day 
28)  
Seroconversion for IgG ELISA endpoint 
tire: ≥1:200  and > x4 pre-vaccination 
titre. Seroconversion for PRNT60: 
endpoint tire ≥ x4 compared with pre-
vaccination titre.  
Geometric mean titres and 95% CI for 
IgG ELISA and neutralising antibodies.  
Non-transformed antibody titres were 
compared between the different vaccine 
doses groups using the non-parametric 
Wilcoxon rank sum test.  
Prespecified test of linear trend of 
immune response increasing with dose 
was done with method by Rom and 
colleagues.  
 
   
• Most adverse events occurred in the first 
day after vaccination, mild-moderate in 
intensity, short duration and more frequent 
at high vaccine doses  
• At 2x107 PFU doses versus placebo most 
adverse local events within 14 days were: 
arm pain (57.4% vs 7.4%), local 
tenderness (59.6% vs 8.5%) Common 
systemic event were: headache (46.8% vs 
27.7%), fatigue (38.3% vs 19.1%), 
myalgia (34.0% vs 10.6%), subjective 
fever (29.8% vs. 2.1%), shivering/chils 
(27.7% vs 7.4%), sweats (23.4% vs 3.2%), 
joint aches and pain (19.1% vs 7.4%), 
objective fever (14.9% vs.1.1%) and joint 
tenderness or swelling (14.9% vs 2.1%)  
•  Self-limited, post vaccination arthritis 
occurred in 4-5% of vaccines vs 3.2% of 
controls. No apparent dose relationship  
• Post-vaccination dermatitis in 5.7% of 
vaccines vs 3.2% of controls  
• Antibody responses were observed in 
most participants by day 14.  
• IgG and neutralising antibody titres were 
dose-related (p=0.0003 for IgG ELISA 
and p<0.0001 for the 60% plaque-
reduction neuralisations test by linear 
trend) 
• On day 28 at the 2x107 PFU dose the 
geometric mean IgG ELISA endpoint titre 
was 1624 (95% CI 1146-2302) and 
seroconversion was 95.7% (95% CI 85.5-
98.8), the geometric mean neutralising 
antibody titre by PRNT 60 was 250 (176-
355) and seroconversion was 95.7% 
(85.5-98.8).  
• These robust immunological responses 
were sustained for 1 year.  
 Check list:  
• Is the purpose of the study 
clearly defined? Yes 
• Was the sample allocated to the 
different groups using a 
randomisation procedure? Yes  
• Were all participants 
accounted for at the end of the 
study? Yes  
• Were participants and 
personnel blinded? Yes  
• Were the differences between 
the groups at the beginning of 
the study? More men than 
women in study, other baseline 
characteristics were similar 
across groups  
• Was the follow-up of both 
groups identical? Clinical 
assessments for cohort 1 and 2 
preformed on different days 
following vaccination.  
• What were the results? 
rVSV∆G-ZEBOV-GP was well 
tolerated and stimulated a rapid 
onset of binding and 
neutralising antibodies, which 
were maintained through to day 
360. The immunogenicity 
results support selection of the 
2 × 107 PFU dose. 
• Are the results transferrable to 
clinical practice? Study 
conducted in USA under non-
epidemic conditions. Thus, 
outcomes may differ.  
• Were all outcomes measured?  
Yes  
• Do the benefits outweigh the 
disadvantages/costs? Yes  
 
  Strengths  
-Study conducted under randomised 
circumstances  
- First comprehensive study that 
reported 360 days of data on safety 
and immunogenicity of the rVSVΔG-
ZEBOV-GP vaccine.   
 
 
  Weaknesses  
- Follow up on solicited adverse 
events were collected for 14 days for 
cohort 1 and for 56 days in cohort 2 
! lower sensitivity for capturing 
post-injection event in cohort 1 vs 2.  
 
-Absence of cellular and innate 
immune studies. The immunological 
correlates of protection induced by 






Local and systemic adverse events 
induced by vaccine was of early 
onset, mild-moderate, well tolerated, 
transient and dose-dependent.  
Delayed self-limited arthritis in 
vaccines was unrelated to dose  
Dose effect was seen at onset and 
durability of binding and neutralising 
antibodies manintained at day 14-day 
360  
Binding and neutralisisng antibodies 
sustained at all vaccine doses for min. 
1 year post immunisation.  
The immunogenicity results support 











Reference:       Henao-Restrepo AM, Camacho A, Longini IM, Watson CH, Edmunds WJ, Egger M, et al. Efficacy and 
effectiveness of an rVSV-vectored vaccine in preventing Ebola virus disease: final results from the Guinea ring 





 Ib/IIa  
Grade:  2 
Aim Material and Methods  Results  Discussion 
To assess the efficacy of 
the rVSV-ZEBOV 
vaccine for the 
prevention of Ebola 
virus disease in human 
beings 
Study design: Open-label, cluster-randomised ring vaccination 
trial.  
 
Recruitment of the study population: 
After confirmation of a case of EVD enumeration on a list a 
ring (cluster) of all their contacts and contact of contacts.  
Contacts: Individuals who, within the last 21 days, lived in the 
same household, were visited by the index case after the onset 
of symptoms or were in close physical contact with the 
patient´s body or body fluids, linen or clothes.  
Contacts of contacts: Neighbours, family or extended family 
members living within the nearest geographical boundary of all 
contacts, plus household members of any high-risk contacts.  
 
Exclusion- criteria for contacts: History of EVD, age <18 years 
old, pregnancy/breastfeeding, history of administration of other 
experimental treatments during past 28 days, history of 
anaphylaxis to a vaccine or vaccine component or serious 
disease requiring confining to bed or admission to hospital by 
time of vaccination.  
 
The study population and randomization:  
Randomly assigned clusters (1:1) to either 1) immediate 
vaccination or 2) delayed vaccination (after 21 days).  
 
476 confirmed cases of EVD. 117 clusters defined. 98 clusters 
randomised, 19 non-randomised. Randomised group: 51 
clusters immediate vaccination (4539 contacts and contacts of 
contacts) where 2219 were vaccinated. 47 clusters delayed 
vaccination (4557) contacts and contacts of contacts) with 940 




Prespecified primary outcome was laboratory confirmed case 
EVD with onset 10 days or more from randomisation. All 
contacts are monitored at home by members of the Ebola 
response team for 21 days after their last known exposure to the 
case.  
 
Statistical analysis:  
Vaccine efficacy: VE=1-è where è=ë1/ë0 is the hazard ratio of 
ë1 (the hazard of disease for eligible and vaccinated individuals 
in a ring who receive immediate vaccination) and ë0 (hazard of 
disease for eligible individuals in a ring who receive delayed 
vaccination.  
Hazard ratio was estimated using Cox proportional hazard 
regression model.  
No cases of EVD occurred 10 
days or more among 
randomly assigned and 
contacts of contact in 
immediate cluster. 
16 cases of EVD (7 clusters 
affected) among all eligible 
individuals in delayed 
clusters.  
Vaccine efficacy: 100% (95% 
CI 68.9-100.0 p=0.0045)  
 
Evidence from all 117 
clusters (included the non-
randomised clusters) showed 
that no cases of EVD 
occurred 10 days or more 
after randomisation among all 
immediately vaccinated 
contacts and contacts of 
contacts vs. 23 cases (11 
clusters) among eligible 
contacts and contacts of 
contacts in delayed plus all 
eligible contacts and contacts 
of contacts never vaccinated 
in immediate clusters. 
Estimated vaccine efficacy: 
100% (95% CI 79.3-100.0 
p=0.0033) 
 Checklist: 
• Is the purpose of the study clearly 
stated? Yes.  
• Was the sample allocated to the 
different groups using a 
randomisation procedure? Yes. 
• Were all participants accounted for at 
the end of the study? Yes. 
• Were participants and personnel 
blinded? No, not possible, as this was 
an open-label study.  
• Were the differences between the 
groups at the beginning of the study? 
Some differences: Time to cluster 
definition was shorter on the 
immediate vaccination group, had 
also more high-risk contacts reported. 
• Was the follow-up of both groups 
identical? Yes, rates of participant 
compliance for all visits roughly 90 % 
for all visits in both groups, but the 
monitoring at home poorly described. 
• What were the results? Vaccine 
efficacy 100%.  
• Are the results transferrable? Ring 
vaccination with an effective vaccine 
can contribute as a control strategy 
for future outbreaks of Ebola virus 
disease. 
• Were all outcomes measured? Yes. 
• Do the benefits outweigh the 
disadvantages/costs? Yes.  
 
Strengths: 
- Generated meaningful data for vaccine 




- Relatively small study size (true vaccine 
efficacy may be lower)  
- Study conducted when incidence of EVD 
was low and declining.  
- Recruitment of the contacts based on what 
the cases say/remember. Selection bias? 
- The proportion of contacts vs. contacts of 
contacts the same in the both groups? A 
larger proportion of contacts, with a higher 
risk of being transmitted, in the delayed 
group?  
- The incubation period varies from 2-21 
days, and it is impossible to say if a contact 
was in contact with the case before or after 
the case was infected. Confounding?  
- Not blinded: More aware of symptoms in 
the delayed group? 
 
Conclusion 
The results add weight 




against Ebola virus 
disease.  
Countries 
Guinea, Sierra Leone  
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Design: Cross-sectional study 
Level of scientific 
evidence: 
 III 
Grade:   2 
Aim  Material and methods Results Discussion 
To conduct epidemiologic 
investigation and virologic 
analysis of blood samples from 
patients with symptoms of 
mysterious disease. 
Patients: 
Blood samples were 
obtained from 20 patients 
hospitalized in the study 
countries because of fever, 
diarrhoea, vomiting or 
haemorrhage (suspected of 
being infected).  
Demographic and clinical 
data for the patients were 
provided on the laboratory 
request forms.  
 
Virus detection: 
Blood samples analysed in 
biosafety 4 laboratories in 
Lyon, France and Hamburg.  
Conventional Filoviridae-
specific RT-PCR assays 
targeting a conserved region 
in the L-gene, in addition to 
EBOV-specific real-tome 
RT-PCR assays targeting the 
glycoprotein or 
nucleoprotein gene. 
Complete EBOV genomes 
were sequenced with the use 
of conventional Sanger 
techniques. 
Specimens from Electron 
microscopy were 
additionally used for two 




Gathered data on possible 
transmission chains from 
hospital records and through 
interview with patients.  
Samples from 15/20 patients positive on 
conventional L gene PCR assay and real-time 
assays.  
EBOV identified in serum from 1 patient on 
electron microscopy, 5 patient samples revealed 
EBOV from cell cultures.  
Three patient samples were completely sequenced. 
The Guinean EBOV strain showed 97% idenity to 
EBOV strains from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Gabon.  
Confirmed cases originated from hospitals in 
Guéckédou, Macenta, Nzérékoré, and Kissidougou 
prefectures  
Index case was a 2-year old child who Meliandou 
in Guéckédou prefecture in late December 2013. 
Patients S2 (sister), S3 (mother) and S4 
(grandmother) died in January. Patient S14 was a 
health worker and triggered the spread to Macenta, 
Nzérékoré, and Kissidougou in February 2014.  
13 of the confirmed cases could be linked to four 
different clusters, with all these clusters being 
linked to several deaths in the villages of 
Meliandou and Dawa between December 2013 and 
March 2014. 
Before end of March 2014, 111 clinically 
suspected cases and 79 deaths had been recorded 
in the prefectures of Guéckédou, Macenta, and 
Kissidougou.  
The high degree of similarity among the 15 partial 
L gene sequences + three full length sequences + 
epidemiologic links between cases suggest a single 
introduction of virus into human population  
The phylogenetic analysis established a separate 
clade for the Guinean EBOV strain. This strain has 
evolved in parallel with strains from DRC and 
Gabon from a recent ancestor and has not been 





• Was the population where the samples 
were obtained from clearly defined? No, 
only that the 20 hospitalized patients who 
were suspected of being infected.  
• Was the sample representative for the 
population? Uncertain.  
• Is it accounted for (and how) whether the 
respondents differed from the non-
respondents? Probably not relevant, but 
not presented.  
• Is the response rate high enough? Not 
relevant (?). 
• Was the collection of data standardised? 
Probably, but the blood samples were 
analysed in different laboratories in Lyon, 
France and Hamburg.  
• Were the criteria for evaluation of outcome 
objective? Yes.  
• Were the methods used in the analysis of 
data adequate? Yes.  
  
Strengths 




- Selection of cases uncertain/not adequately 
described 
- Data on transmission chains collected 
retrospectively in unstandardized fashion, 
providing opportunity for cases being missed.  
- Lack of understanding of the evolutionary rate 
of EBOV in nature. Cannot determine the timing 
and its phylogenetic origin.  
- Analyses done in different laboratories 
(differences?) 
Conclusion 
The study demonstrates the 
emergence of a new EBOV 
strain in Guinea. Epidemiologic 
investigation linked the 
laboratory-confirmed cases with 
the presumed first fatality of the 
outbreaks in December 2013.  
Country 
Guinea 
Years of data collection 
2014 
